Choose an application

• Reference Manager
• EndNote
• RefWorks (Direct export to RefWorks)

This monograph purports to provide a solution to semantical paradoxes like ""the liar"". The authors base this solution on J.L.Austin's idea of truth, which is fundamental to situation semantics, and compare two models of language, propositions and truth.

Liar paradox. --- Liar paradox --- Logic --- Philosophy --- Philosophy & Religion --- Antinomy of the liar --- Epimenidean paradox --- Liar antinomy --- Paradox of Epimenides --- Paradox of Russell --- Paradox of the liar --- Russell's paradox --- Paradox --- Semantics (Philosophy)

Choose an application

• Reference Manager
• EndNote
• RefWorks (Direct export to RefWorks)

Liar paradox. --- Antinomy of the liar --- Epimenidean paradox --- Liar antinomy --- Paradox of Epimenides --- Paradox of Russell --- Paradox of the liar --- Russell's paradox --- Logic --- Paradox --- Semantics (Philosophy)

Choose an application

• Reference Manager
• EndNote
• RefWorks (Direct export to RefWorks)

The problem of truth and the liar paradox is one of the most extensive problems of philosophy. The liar paradox can be avoided by assuming a so-called theory of partial truth instead of a classical theory of truth. Theories of partial truth, however, cannot solve the so-called strengthened liar paradox, which is the problem that many semantic statements about the so-called strengthened liar cannot be true in a theory of partial truth. If such semantic statements were true in the theory, another paradox would emerge. To proponents of contextual accounts, which assume that the concept of truth is context-dependent, the strengthened liar paradox is the core of the liar problem. This book provides an overview of current contextual approaches to the strengthened liar paradox. For this purpose, the author investigates formal theories of truth that result from formal reconstructions of such contextual approaches.

Truth. --- Liar paradox. --- Antinomy of the liar --- Epimenidean paradox --- Liar antinomy --- Paradox of Epimenides --- Paradox of Russell --- Paradox of the liar --- Russell's paradox --- Logic --- Paradox --- Semantics (Philosophy) --- Conviction --- Belief and doubt --- Philosophy --- Skepticism --- Certainty --- Necessity (Philosophy) --- Pragmatism

Choose an application

• Reference Manager
• EndNote
• RefWorks (Direct export to RefWorks)

The Liar Paradox challenges logicians’ and semanticists’ theories of truth and meaning. Modern accounts of paradoxes in formal semantics offer solutions through the hierarchy of object language and metalanguage. Yet this solution to the Liar presupposes that sentences have unique meaning. This assumption is non-controversial in formal languages, but an account of how “hidden meaning” is made explicit is necessary to any complete analysis of natural language. Since the Liar Paradox presents itself as a sentence uniting contradictory meanings, appreciating how they can be united in a single sentence may provide new insights into this and other paradoxes. This volume includes a target paper, taking up the challenge to revive, within a modern (formal) framework, a medieval solution to the Liar Paradox which did not assume Uniqueness of Meaning. Stephen Read, author of the target paper, attempts to formally state a theory of truth that dates back to the 14th century logician Thomas Bradwardine; the theory offers a solution to the Liar Paradox in which the Liar sentence turns out to be false. The rest of the volume consists of papers discussing and/or challenging Read’s – and Bradwardine’s -- views one the one hand, and papers addressing the doctrinal and historical background of medieval theories of truth on the other hand. It also includes a critical edition of Heytesbury’s treatise on insolubles, closely related to Bradwardine’s view. Including formal, philosophical and historical discussions, this volume intends to renew the debate about paradoxes and theory of truth, and to show that the interest of earlier medieval work is not merely historical but, on the contrary, still relevant for modern, formal semantic theory. It is of interest for both professional philosophers and advanced students of philosophy.

Liar paradox. --- Truth. --- Semantics (Philosophy) --- Antinomy of the liar --- Epimenidean paradox --- Liar antinomy --- Paradox of Epimenides --- Paradox of Russell --- Paradox of the liar --- Russell's paradox --- Logic --- Paradox --- Intension (Philosophy) --- Logical semantics --- Semantics (Logic) --- Semeiotics --- Significs --- Syntactics --- Unified science --- Language and languages --- Logic, Symbolic and mathematical --- Logical positivism --- Meaning (Psychology) --- Philosophy, Modern --- Semiotics --- Signs and symbols --- Symbolism --- Analysis (Philosophy) --- Definition (Philosophy) --- Conviction --- Belief and doubt --- Philosophy --- Skepticism --- Certainty --- Necessity (Philosophy) --- Pragmatism --- Logic. --- Linguistics --- Semantics. --- Philosophy, medieval. --- Philosophy of Language. --- Medieval Philosophy. --- Philosophy. --- Medieval philosophy --- Scholasticism --- Formal semantics --- Semasiology --- Semiology (Semantics) --- Comparative linguistics --- Information theory --- Lexicology --- Argumentation --- Deduction (Logic) --- Deductive logic --- Dialectic (Logic) --- Logic, Deductive --- Intellect --- Psychology --- Science --- Reasoning --- Thought and thinking --- Methodology --- Language and languages—Philosophy. --- Medieval philosophy. --- Semiotics. --- Philosophy, Medieval. --- Semiology (Linguistics) --- Semantics --- Structuralism (Literary analysis)