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Abstract It is fair to say that the problem of luck has been the Achilles heel for indeterminist for as long as the problem has been construed. Yet, in more recent times, a particular libertarian theory known as agent-causation has been said to be equipped enough to withstand the objections that luck offers. Still, there are some who believe that particular manifestations of the luck problem still remain a problem for agent-causation. One manifestation in particular is the argument from the unavailability of contrastive explanation or the contrastive argument for short. This argument aims to expose the weakness of the agent-causal theory by demonstrating that it unable to provide an adequate contrastive explanations why an agent causes a particular decision or action in one world, W1, while in another, W2, constituted by the very same laws of nature and past history as W1, the agent causes a different decision or action. Given that no contrastive argument can be given, the argument concludes that whatever the agent causes is simply a matter of luck. What is more, it is said that since it is a matter of luck which action or decision the agent causes to occur, the occurrence of that event cannot be free. And if the occurrence of an event is not free it would appear as though the level of agential control that the agent-causationist seeks to employ the agent with is insufficient in securing free will. In the present study, I aim to investigate the contrastive argument to examine whether it is a sincere concern for the agent-causationist and also, to inspect whether the ramifications the argument is said to have on agent-causation is as grave as they are made out to be. To complete this task, I first provide a general map of the free will debate to locate the agent-causal theory. Then, I demonstrate the superiority of one approach to the theory, namely the alternative approach, by exemplifying its ability in constructing and intelligible account of agent-causation and rational actions. I then move on to outline the problem of luck in great detail beginning with the argument from cross-world analysis before presenting its strengthened form, the contrastive argument. From here, I go on to outline some various responses on behalf of Randolph Clarke and Timothy O'Connor. Once their respective responses have been given, I conclude by sharing some personal remarks on the state of the contrastive argument as it relates to the agent-causal theory. Ultimately, I commend the contrastive argument for pressing the agent-causal theorist to provide an adequate metaphysical contrastive explanation. However, I also highlight that the ramifications of not having a metaphysical contrastive explanation are not nearly as grave as some have made them out to be; specifically, regardless of whether a contrastive explanation is available or not, it determines nothing in regards to our free will.