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This paper examines firm entry and survival in exporting, and in products and markets not previously served by any domestic exporters. The authors use data on the nontraditional agriculture sector in Peru, which grew seven-fold from 1994 to 2007. They find tremendous firm entry and exit in the export sector, with exits more likely after one year and among firms that start small. There is also significant entry and exit in new markets. In contrast, such trial and error in new products is rare. New products are typically discovered by large experienced exporters and there is increased entry after products are discovered. The results imply that high sunk costs of entry are of concern for product discovery, especially for products that are not consumed domestically. In contrast, the tremendous entry and exit in exporting and in new markets suggests that initial sunk costs are relatively low. The authors develop a model that explains how entrepreneurs decide to export and to develop new export products and markets when there are sunk costs of discovery and uncertainty about idiosyncratic costs. The model explains many features of the data.

Access to Markets --- Brand --- Brand names --- Competitiveness --- Debt Markets --- Direct market --- Domestic market --- Domestic markets --- Economic Theory & Research --- Export market --- Export markets --- Finance and Financial Sector Development --- Home market --- International Economics and Trade --- International markets --- International trade --- Macroeconomics and Economic Growth --- Market access --- Market conditions --- Market development --- Market information --- Market share --- Marketing --- Markets and Market Access --- Merchandise --- Microfinance --- Product market --- Sales

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In the last fifteen years, game theory has become the dominant model in economic theory and has made significant contributions to political science, biology, and international security studies. The central role of game theory in economic theory was recognized by the awarding of the Nobel Memorial Prize in Economic Science in 1994 to the pioneering game theorists John C. Harsanyi, John Nash, and Reinhard Selten. The fundamental works for which they were honored are all included in this volume. Harold Kuhn, himself a major contributor to game theory for his reformulation of extensive games, has chosen eighteen essays that constitute the core of game theory as its exists today. Drawn from a variety of sources, they will be an invaluable tool for researchers in game theory and for a broad group of students of economics, political science, and biology.

Operational research. Game theory --- Game theory. --- Economics, Mathematical. --- Théorie des jeux --- Mathématiques économiques --- Game theory --- Mathematical economics --- 330.1 --- Economische grondbegrippen. Algemene begrippen in de economie --- 330.1 Economische grondbegrippen. Algemene begrippen in de economie --- Théorie des jeux --- Mathématiques économiques --- Economics, Mathematical --- Games, Theory of --- Theory of games --- Mathematical models --- Mathematics --- Economics --- Econometrics --- Methodology --- Theorie --- Spieltheorie --- teoria dei giochi --- Spieltheorie. --- Game Theory. --- Game Theory --- Mathematisches Spiel --- Bayes-equivalence. --- Borel-measurable function. --- Harsanyi, John C. --- Morgenstern. --- Nash equilibrium point. --- Walras law. --- absence of coalitions. --- attribute vector. --- behavioral strategies. --- combinatorial problem. --- commodity-wise saturation. --- complete information. --- core. --- critical vector. --- decomposable game. --- direct market. --- equilibrium point. --- exchange economy. --- game tree. --- homeomorphic mapping. --- individually rational. --- joint probability, objective. --- local strategies. --- minimax condition. --- numerical probability. --- optimal strategies. --- payoff vector. --- permissible coalition. --- prior-lottery model. --- pure strategies. --- random-vector model. --- stable outcome. --- supinf condition. --- transferable utility. --- two-person games. --- utility function. --- vector system.