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For centuries, certain moral philosophers have maintained that morality is an illusion, comparable to talking of ghosts or unicorns. These moral skeptics claim that the world simply doesn't contain the sort of properties (such as moral badness, moral obligation, etc.) necessary to render moral statements true. Even seemingly obvious moral claims, such as "killing innocents is morally wrong" fail to be true. What would lead someone to adopt such a radical viewpoint? Are the arguments in its favor defensible or plausible? What impact would embracing such a view have on one's practical life? Taking as its point of departure the work of moral philosopher John Mackie (1917-1981), A World Without Values is a collection of essays on moral skepticism by leading contemporary philosophers, some of whom are sympathetic to Mackie's views, some of whom are opposed. Rather than treating moral skepticism as something to dismiss as quickly as possible, this anthology is a comprehensive exploration of the topic, and as such will be a valuable resource for students of moral philosophy at all levels, as well as professionals in the field of meta-ethics. A World Without Values presents state-of-the-art arguments that advance the ongoing philosophical debate on several fronts, and will enjoy an important place on any meta-ethicist's bookshelf for some years to come.
Philosophy. --- Ethics. --- Philosophy (General). --- Morale --- Ethics, Modern --- Nihilism (Philosophy) --- Mackie, J. L. --- Nihilism (Philosophy). --- Philosophy --- Mackie, John Leslie
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God --- Theism --- Proof --- Mackie, J L --- Atheism --- -Theism --- 141.4 --- Philosophy --- Religion --- Misotheism --- Panentheism --- Metaphysics --- Monotheism --- Agnosticism --- Free thought --- Irreligion --- Secularism --- Stelsels met betrekking tot het standpunt van het godsprobleem --- Mackie, J. L. --- Atheism. --- Theism. --- Athéisme. --- Dieu --- Théisme. --- Proof. --- Existence. --- 141.4 Stelsels met betrekking tot het standpunt van het godsprobleem --- God - Proof --- Mackie, J L - (John Leslie) - Miracle of theism
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Ethics --- Values --- Morale --- Valeurs (Philosophie) --- Mackie, J. L. --- Axiology --- Worth --- Aesthetics --- Knowledge, Theory of --- Metaphysics --- Psychology --- Deontology --- Ethics, Primitive --- Ethology --- Moral philosophy --- Morality --- Morals --- Philosophy, Moral --- Science, Moral --- Philosophy --- Ethics. --- Values. --- Mackie, John Leslie --- Ethique --- Ethiek.
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For centuries, certain moral philosophers have maintained that morality is an illusion, comparable to talking of ghosts or unicorns. These moral skeptics claim that the world simply doesn’t contain the sort of properties (such as moral badness, moral obligation, etc.) necessary to render moral statements true. Even seemingly obvious moral claims, such as "killing innocents is morally wrong" fail to be true. What would lead someone to adopt such a radical viewpoint? Are the arguments in its favor defensible or plausible? What impact would embracing such a view have on one’s practical life? Taking as its point of departure the work of moral philosopher John Mackie (1917-1981), A World Without Values is a collection of essays on moral skepticism by leading contemporary philosophers, some of whom are sympathetic to Mackie’s views, some of whom are opposed. Rather than treating moral skepticism as something to dismiss as quickly as possible, this anthology is a comprehensive exploration of the topic, and as such will be a valuable resource for students of moral philosophy at all levels, as well as professionals in the field of meta-ethics. A World Without Values presents state-of-the-art arguments that advance the ongoing philosophical debate on several fronts, and will enjoy an important place on any meta-ethicist’s bookshelf for some years to come.
Analysis (Philosophy). --- Language and languages -- Philosophy. --- Logic. --- Mackie, J. L. (John Leslie). --- Ethics, Modern --- Nihilism (Philosophy) --- Philosophy & Religion --- Ethics --- Philosophy --- Analysis (Philosophy) --- Language and languages --- Philosophy. --- Mackie, J. L. --- Argumentation --- Deduction (Logic) --- Deductive logic --- Dialectic (Logic) --- Logic, Deductive --- Analysis, Linguistic (Philosophy) --- Analysis, Logical --- Analysis, Philosophical --- Analytic philosophy --- Analytical philosophy --- Linguistic analysis (Philosophy) --- Logical analysis --- Philosophical analysis --- Philosophy, Analytical --- Mackie, John Leslie --- Ethics. --- Intellect --- Psychology --- Science --- Reasoning --- Thought and thinking --- Methodology --- Logical positivism --- Semantics (Philosophy) --- Deontology --- Ethics, Primitive --- Ethology --- Moral philosophy --- Morality --- Morals --- Philosophy, Moral --- Science, Moral --- Values
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Jonas Olson presents an original account of the historical background of moral error theory, and examines in particular J.L. Mackie's influential contributions to the debate. In Part I (History), Olson provides the historical context of the debate, and discusses the moral error theories of David Hume and some of the more or less influential twentieth century philosophers, including Axel Hägerström, Bertrand Russell, Ludwig Wittgenstein, and Richard Robinson. He argues that the early cases for moral error theory are suggestive but that they would have been stronger had they included something like Mackie's arguments that moral properties and facts are metaphysically queer. Part II (Critique) focuses on these arguments. Olson identifies four queerness arguments, concerning supervenience, knowledge, motivation, and irreducible normativity, and goes on to establish that while the first three are not compelling, the fourth has considerable force, especially when combined with debunking explanations of why we tend to believe that there are moral properties and facts when in fact there are none. One conclusion of Part II is that a plausible error theory takes he form of an error theory about irreducible normativity. In Part III (Defense), Olson considers challenges according to which that kind of error theory has problematic ramifications regarding hypothetical reasons, epistemic reasons, and deliberation. He ends his discussion with a consideration of the upshots of moral error theory for ordinary moral thought and talk, and for normative theorizing. -- Book jacket.
General ethics --- Moral realism. --- Ethics --- Realism --- Mackie, J. L. --- Hume, David, --- Hägerström, Axel, --- Hägerström, Axel Anders Theodor, --- Haegerstroem, Axel, --- Hsiu-mo, Ta-wei, --- Юм, Д., --- I︠U︡m, D., --- Yum, Daṿid, --- יום, דוד --- Hume, Dawid, --- Hyūma, Ḍeviḍa, --- Hyūma, --- Home, David, --- Mackie, John Leslie --- Philosophy. --- Metaethik. --- Skeptizismus. --- Etik. --- ukslc. --- Mackie, John L., --- Philosophy --- Ukslc. --- Hume, David --- Moral realism
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