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This Executive Board Work Program (BWP) for FY 2025 (May 2024 to April 2025) is the first since the Executive Board has started to pilot a new strategic cycle, which aims at incorporating Directors’ broader views on work priorities at an earlier stage in the planning process for the fiscal year. Highlevel costing indicators are also included for non-recurring items based on a pilot costing exercise. The BWP focuses on supporting the membership in responding to current challenges through prompt and tailored policy advice, financial assistance, and support for debt restructuring and capacity development.1 It ensures that the Board can continue to closely monitor economic and financial developments and discuss macro policy responses. The BWP also provides opportunities to deliberate on key Fund policies and operations. The BWP will need to stay flexible to prioritize the membership’s changing needs while operating within the Fund’s constrained budget environment.

Economics --- Finance --- Finance: General --- Financial sector policy and analysis --- Financial sector stability --- Financial services industry --- General Financial Markets: Government Policy and Regulation --- Monetary economics --- Monetary Policy --- Monetary policy --- Money and Monetary Policy --- Political Economy --- Political economy

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In this paper, we use a DSGE model to study the passive and time-varying implementation of macroprudential policy when policymakers have noisy and lagged data, as commonly observed in lowincome and developing countries (LIDCs). The model features an economy with two agents; households and entrepreneurs. Entrepreneurs are the borrowers in this economy and need capital as collateral to obtain loans. The macroprudential regulator uses the collateral requirement as the policy instrument. In this set-up, we compare policy performances of permanently increasing the collateral requirement (passive policy) versus a time-varying (active) policy which responds to credit developments. Results show that with perfect and timely information, an active approach is welfare superior, since it is more effective in providing financial stability with no long-run output cost. If the policymaker is not able to observe the economic conditions perfectly or observe with a lag, a cautious (less aggressive) policy or even a passive approach may be preferred. However, the latter comes at the expense of increasing inequality and a long-run output cost. The results therefore point to the need for a more careful consideration toward the passive policy, which is usually advocated for LIDCs.

Credit. --- Borrowing --- Finance --- Money --- Loans --- Finance: General --- Macroeconomics --- Industries: Financial Services --- Financial Markets and the Macroeconomy --- Business Fluctuations --- Cycles --- General Financial Markets: Government Policy and Regulation --- Banks --- Depository Institutions --- Micro Finance Institutions --- Mortgages --- Aggregate Factor Income Distribution --- Macroeconomics: Consumption --- Saving --- Wealth --- Financial sector stability --- Macroprudential policy --- Collateral --- Income inequality --- Consumption --- Financial services industry --- Economic policy --- Income distribution --- Economics

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The paper assesses the degree of banking competition and efficiency in Italy?over time as well as compared to that in other countries, such as France, Germany, Spain, the United Kingdom, and the United States. The paper finds competition in the Italian banking sector has intensified in loan and deposit markets in recent years, but banks still operate in a highcost, high-income system, particularly with respect to retail/services, and efficiency gains have yet to fully materialize. The degree of competition falls within the range of estimates for a set of comparator countries. Greater contestability should act as a powerful force to drive banks to become more competitive and efficient. Competition policy will also continue to be an important consideration, both in enforcing Italy's antitrust laws and in ensuring that the procedures for dealing with weak banks and other merger and acquisition reviews focus on stability and competition objectives.

Banks and Banking --- Finance: General --- Macroeconomics --- Banks --- Depository Institutions --- Micro Finance Institutions --- Mortgages --- General Financial Markets: General (includes Measurement and Data) --- Personal Income, Wealth, and Their Distributions --- General Financial Markets: Government Policy and Regulation --- Banking --- Finance --- Competition --- Commercial banks --- Personal income --- Financial sector stability --- Banks and banking --- Income --- Financial services industry --- Italy

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The global financial crisis hit the Netherlands' financial sector hard. This note analyzes the Dutch framework for crisis management and bank resolution, and formulates recommendations to address observed weaknesses. The overall framework for official financial support to stem systemic crisis is appropriate. The current framework for resolving ailing banks in going could be strengthened considerably. The framework for the orderly liquidation of banks could be strengthened and fine-tuned. The deposit guarantee scheme (DGS) has a number of helpful characteristics, but could be significantly enhanced.

Banks and Banking --- Finance: General --- Financial Risk Management --- Financial Institutions and Services: Government Policy and Regulation --- Banks --- Depository Institutions --- Micro Finance Institutions --- Mortgages --- General Financial Markets: Government Policy and Regulation --- Crisis Management --- Economic & financial crises & disasters --- Banking --- Finance --- Bank resolution --- Bank resolution framework --- Bank liquidation --- Financial sector stability --- Financial crises --- Crisis management --- Crisis resolution --- Banks and banking --- Financial services industry --- Netherlands, The

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Las autoridades de política económica suelen ser renuentes a otorgar independencia a los organismos que regulan y supervisan el sector financiero debido al temor de que estos organismos, con responsabilidades y poderes de amplio alcance, puedan convertirse en una fuente normativa por sí mismos. Este folleto describe los mecanismos para que los organismos reguladores rindan cuentas no solo ante el gobierno sino también ante la industria que supervisan y el público en general, con ejemplos sobre una amplia gama de países.

Banks and Banking --- Finance: General --- Industries: Financial Services --- Business and Financial --- General Financial Markets: Government Policy and Regulation --- Financial Institutions and Services: Government Policy and Regulation --- Banks --- Depository Institutions --- Micro Finance Institutions --- Mortgages --- Financial services law & regulation --- Banking --- Finance --- Financial regulation and supervision --- Financial services --- Bank supervision --- Financial sector stability --- Financial services industry --- Law and legislation --- Banks and banking --- State supervision --- Canada