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In an economy à la Diamond and Dybvig (1983), we present an example in which foreign lenders find it profitable to invest in an emerging market if, and only if, the emerging market government imposes taxes on short-term capital inflows. This implies that capital controls that are effective in reducing the vulnerability of emerging markets to financial crises may increase the volume of capital inflows.

Exports and Imports --- Finance: General --- Financial Risk Management --- Current Account Adjustment --- Short-term Capital Movements --- Information and Market Efficiency --- Event Studies --- Investment Banking --- Venture Capital --- Brokerage --- Ratings and Ratings Agencies --- International Investment --- Long-term Capital Movements --- General Financial Markets: General (includes Measurement and Data) --- Financial Crises --- International economics --- Finance --- Economic & financial crises & disasters --- Capital inflows --- Emerging and frontier financial markets --- Capital controls --- Financial crises --- Capital flows --- Balance of payments --- Financial markets --- Capital movements --- Financial services industry --- Chile

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Economics

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The World Bank Group recently adopted the "cascade framework" to "maximize finance for development." The cascade recommends that reforms be tried first, followed by subsidies, and then public investments. To understand the economics of the cascade, this paper presents a model where reforms, subsidies, and public investments can be used to fill the investment gap, and computes the welfare associated with their different sequencing. The cascade is optimal when reforms increase efficiency at no cost. When they are costly, if policies can be project specific, their sequencing does not matter; if not, the cascade can be optimal if agents are myopic, but not if they are forward-looking. Tensions may thus arise between maximizing private financing and optimizing financing for development.

Cascade Framework --- Development Aid --- Finance --- Industry --- Law and Development --- Marketing --- Private Sector Development --- Private Sector Development Law --- Private Sector Economics --- Public Investment --- Public Sector Development --- Public Sector Management --- Reforms --- Science and Technology Development --- Subsidies --- Technology Industry --- Technology Innovation

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This book considers how emerging economies around the world face the challenge of building good institutions and effective governance, since so much of economic development depends on having these in place. The promotion of shared prosperity and the battle against poverty require interventions to reach out to the poor and the disadvantaged. Yet time and again we have seen such effort foild or diminished by corruption and leakage. The creation of good governance and institutions and structures to combat corruption require determination and passion but also intricate design rooted in data, analysis, and research. In this book, leading researchers from around the world bring to the table some of the best available ideas to help create better governance structures, design laws for corruption control, and nurture good institutions.

Political corruption. --- Corruption --- Prevention. --- International economics. --- Law and economics. --- Economics. --- International Economics. --- Law and Economics. --- Political Economy/Economic Policy. --- Economic policy, Foreign --- Economic relations, Foreign --- Economics, International --- Foreign economic policy --- Foreign economic relations --- Interdependence of nations --- International economic policy --- International economics --- New international economic order --- Economic policy --- International relations --- Economic sanctions --- Economics and jurisprudence --- Economics and law --- Jurisprudence and economics --- Economics --- Jurisprudence --- Corrupt practices --- Ethics --- Boss rule --- Corruption (in politics) --- Graft in politics --- Malversation --- Political scandals --- Politics, Practical --- Misconduct in office --- Economic policy. --- Economic Policy. --- Economic nationalism --- Economic planning --- National planning --- State planning --- Planning --- National security --- Social policy