Choose an application

• Reference Manager
• EndNote
• RefWorks (Direct export to RefWorks)

In de deontische logica bestaat er een veel bestudeerde paradox die soms de Chisholmparadox en soms de contrary-to-duty-paradox wordt genoemd. Deze paradox ontstaat wanneer een verplichting conditioneel is op de negatie van een andere verplichting. Voor deze paradox zijn verschillende oplossingen voorgesteld. Daarnaast zijn er veel voorwaarden voorgesteld waar een oplossing van de paradox aan moet voldoen. In deze paper worden (nadat een inleiding in de deontische logica en de paradox is gegeven) ten eerste deze voorwaarden geëvalueerd. Daarnaast worden de belangrijkste voorgestelde oplossingen besproken en aan de hand van deze voorwaarden beoordeeld. Het doel van de paper is te achterhalen welke voorgestelde oplossing het best aan de voorwaarden voldoet. Er worden drie categorieën van oplossingen besproken. Ten eerste de oplossingen die gebruik maken van dyadische deontische logica, waar van Fraassens oplossing centraal staat. De tweede besproken categorie van oplossingen betreft oplossingen die gebruik maken van formalisaties met een niet-materiële implicatie. Hier geldt Peter Mott als prototypisch voorbeeld. Ten slotte wordt een derde categorie van oplossingen besproken. Deze categorie maakt een onderscheid tussen verschillende soorten verplichtingen. De specifiek besproken oplossingen in deze categorie zijn de oplossing van Åqvist en van Carmo en Jones. Uiteindelijk zal geconcludeerd worden dat deze laatste oplossing van Carmo en Jones het best aan de voorwaarden voldoet.

Choose an application

• Reference Manager
• EndNote
• RefWorks (Direct export to RefWorks)

KUL --- Academic collection

Choose an application

• Reference Manager
• EndNote
• RefWorks (Direct export to RefWorks)

Throughout the history of philosophy, there have been many espousals of the thesis that logic is normative for reasoning. For example, Kant declares the sollen claim that logic concerns how we ought (sollen) to think. Similarly, Frege also maintains that logic is normative for thinking based on the descriptive adequacy of logical laws and their constitutivity of thoughts. Carnap also adopts a normative conception of logic. Following the same line of reasoning, given the development of inductive logic, it is normative for an agent to reason according to the logical laws of the inductive logical system. However, the view that logic has normative force on reasoning meets contemporary adversaries such as Gilbert Harman, John Broome, and Gillian Russell. Harman's objections rest on his pessimistic attitudes towards the plausibility of inductive logic and his moral relativism. Broome's objection points out the failure of one possible bridge principle. Russell's objections are based on her reliance on fuzzy predicates and on a static hierarchy of degrees of normativity of different theories. In this thesis, the main goal is to argue against the objections and to re-establish the normativity of logic. As a reply to Harman, we present historical inductive logical systems developed by Carnap, Williamson, and nonmonotonic logics developed in AI. We also try to reconceptualise the process of inductive inference and promote an inductive logical system qua nonmonotonic probabilistic logic. We adopt a moral objectivism view which is compatible with our views. As for the reply to Broome, we argue that a different formalisation of the bridge principle can resolve Broome's puzzle. And to Russell, we reply that the static hierarchy is not sustainable in view of some counterexamples, and her rejection of the binary view towards predicates hasn't been well-defended. The upshot is that inductive logic is normative for reasoning.

Choose an application

• Reference Manager
• EndNote
• RefWorks (Direct export to RefWorks)

Attempts in dealing with the collective-distributive ambiguity, which is caused by the different ways that some predicates can be applied to their plural arguments, have led to different resolutions- most of which are pragmatical. This paper, however, offers a resolution which is based on a purely syntactical-semantical approach. This is achieved by using the concept of informativity which expresses the extent of the information that a logical formula expresses based on its truth values represented in the format of a bitstring. Fewer 1’s in a bitstring represent more informativity. If we regard the different readings of a collective-distributive sentence as logical formulas, and if we can find a tool that can assign them their corresponding bitstrings, we can use informativity as a criterion for finding the most informative (and plausible) reading of a collective-distributive sentence. Combinatorial bitstring semantics, which is a tool for assigning bitstrings to a fragment of any arbitrary logical system, provides us with this tool. With the help of this tool, the corresponding bitstrings of the different readings of a collective-distributive sentence are compared with regard to the level of their informativity. The results of this thesis show that the distributive reading is the most informative reading and consequently, it should be regarded as the preferable reading of a collective-distributive sentence.

Choose an application

• Reference Manager
• EndNote
• RefWorks (Direct export to RefWorks)

How can we formally analyse strategic interaction in circumstances which constitute an imperfect duty? To answer that question, a game-theoretical framework, called the Kantian Normative Model (KNM), will be extended to be able to deal with the latitude of imperfect duties. Starting from an analysis of the nature of imperfect duties and an argument for the inadequacy of the Kantian normative model to deal with that type of duties, the new framework KNM+ of infinitely (partially-)repeated Kantian games will be constructed as an extension of KNM. It will be argued that the extended framework is able to adequately deal with imperfect duties, mqinly by including the temporal dimension of reasoning with imperfect duties. Throughout the paper, I will use (both as an example and as a ground for argumentation) Roussel and Demey's construction company case, which is represented as a prisoner's dilemma game including a strategy which constitutes an imperfect duty.