TY - BOOK ID - 862147 TI - Incentives and political economy PY - 2000 SN - 0198294247 9786611943790 1281943797 0191522228 9780191522222 PB - Oxford Oxford university press DB - UniCat KW - Public economics KW - 338.22 KW - Commercial policy KW - Economic policy KW - Incentives in industry KW - Industrial policy KW - Industrial promotion KW - Subsidies KW - #SBIB:324H20 KW - #SBIB:324H40 KW - #SBIB:35H006 KW - #SBIB:003.IO KW - Business subsidies KW - Corporate subsidies KW - Corporate welfare KW - Government subsidies KW - Grants KW - Subventions KW - Vouchers (Subsidies) KW - Welfare, Corporate KW - Government aid KW - Foreign trade promotion KW - Trade adjustment assistance KW - Commerce KW - Industrial development projects KW - Business KW - Industries KW - Industry and state KW - Employee incentives KW - Labor incentives KW - Employee competitive behavior KW - Employee morale KW - Employee motivation KW - Goal setting in personnel management KW - Personnel management KW - Economic nationalism KW - Economic planning KW - National planning KW - State planning KW - Economics KW - Planning KW - National security KW - Social policy KW - Foreign trade policy KW - International trade KW - International trade policy KW - Trade policy KW - International economic relations KW - Economische organisatieleer. Economisch beleid. Economische politiek KW - Politologie: theorieën (democratie, comparatieve studieën….) KW - Politieke structuren: algemeen KW - Bestuurswetenschappen: theorieën KW - Government policy KW - Commercial policy. KW - Economic policy. KW - Incentives in industry. KW - Industrial policy. KW - Industrial promotion. KW - Subsidies. KW - 338.22 Economische organisatieleer. Economisch beleid. Economische politiek KW - Policy sciences KW - E-books KW - Economics. KW - Policy sciences. KW - Policy-making KW - Policymaking KW - Public policy management KW - Economic theory KW - Political economy KW - Social sciences KW - Economic man UR - https://www.unicat.be/uniCat?func=search&query=sysid:862147 AB - Incentives and Political Economy constructs a normative approach to constitutional design using recent developments in contract theory. It treats political economy as the study of the incentive problems created by the delegation of economic policy to self-interested politicians. Politicians are treated successively as informed supervisors or residual decision-makers. The optimal constitutional responses to the activities of interest groups are characterizedin various circumstances, as well as the optimal trade-off between flexibility of decision-making and discretion to pursue personal agendas when the incompleteness of the constitutional contract is recognized. ER -