TY - BOOK ID - 85297404 TI - Bounded rationality and economic diplomacy PY - 2015 SN - 1316434699 1316435407 1316436829 1316438244 131643611X 1316439666 1316401944 1107119537 110755201X 9781107119536 131643043X 9781316439661 9781316401941 9781316436820 9781316438244 9781107552012 9781316435403 9781316438244 9781107552012 PB - Cambridge, United Kingdom DB - UniCat KW - Investments, Foreign KW - International economic relations. KW - Investments, Foreign (International law) KW - International commercial arbitration. KW - International investment law KW - Investment law, International KW - International law KW - Arbitration and award, International KW - Commercial arbitration, International KW - International arbitration and award KW - International commercial arbitration KW - Arbitration and award KW - Conflict of laws KW - Economic policy, Foreign KW - Economic relations, Foreign KW - Economics, International KW - Foreign economic policy KW - Foreign economic relations KW - Interdependence of nations KW - International economic policy KW - International economics KW - New international economic order KW - Economic policy KW - International relations KW - Economic sanctions KW - Law and legislation KW - Investments, Foreign - Developing countries KW - International economic relations UR - https://www.unicat.be/uniCat?func=search&query=sysid:85297404 AB - Modern investment treaties give private arbitrators power to determine whether governments should pay compensation to foreign investors for a wide range of sovereign acts. In recent years, particularly developing countries have incurred significant liabilities from investment treaty arbitration, which begs the question why they signed the treaties in the first place. Through a comprehensive and timely analysis, this book shows that governments in developing countries typically overestimated the economic benefits of investment treaties and practically ignored their risks. Rooted in insights on bounded rationality from behavioural psychology and economics, the analysis highlights how policy-makers often relied on inferential shortcuts when assessing the implications of the treaties, which resulted in systematic deviations from fully rational behaviour. This not only sheds new light on one of the most controversial legal regimes underwriting economic globalization but also provides a novel theoretical account of the often irrational, yet predictable, nature of economic diplomacy. ER -