TY - BOOK ID - 84544025 TI - Multilateral Developing-Country Debt Rescheduling Negotiations : A Bargaining-Theoretic. AU - International Monetary Fund. AU - International Monetary Fund PY - 1988 SN - 1462306675 1455205060 PB - Washington, D.C. : International Monetary Fund, DB - UniCat KW - Asset and liability management KW - Bank credit KW - Banking KW - Banks and Banking KW - Banks and banking KW - Banks KW - Credit KW - Debt Management KW - Debt rescheduling KW - Debt settlement KW - Debt KW - Debts, External KW - Debts, Public KW - Depository Institutions KW - Finance KW - Financial institutions KW - Financial Risk Management KW - Industries: Financial Services KW - Loans KW - Micro Finance Institutions KW - Monetary economics KW - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit: General KW - Money and Monetary Policy KW - Mortgages KW - Public debt KW - Public finance & taxation KW - Public Finance KW - Sovereign Debt KW - United States UR - https://www.unicat.be/uniCat?func=search&query=sysid:84544025 AB - This paper employs a dynamic bargaining-theoretic framework to analyze multilateral sovereign debt rescheduling negotiations. The analysis illustrates how various factors, such as the debtor’s gains from trade and the level of world interest rates, affect the relative bargaining power of various parties to a rescheduling agreement. If creditor–country taxpayers have a vested interest in maintaining normal levels of trade with debtor countries, then they can sometimes be bargained into making sidepayments. The benefits from unanticipated creditor–country sidepayments accrue to both lenders and borrowers. But the benefits from perfectly anticipated sidepayments accrue entirely to borrowers. ER -