TY - BOOK ID - 84542124 TI - The Persistence of Corruption and Regulatory Compliance Failures : Theory and Evidence AU - Fredriksson, Per. AU - Mani, Muthukumara. AU - Damania, Richard. PY - 2003 SN - 1462363989 1451990413 128210778X 9786613801135 1451903855 PB - Washington, D.C. : International Monetary Fund, DB - UniCat KW - Public Finance KW - Taxation KW - Environmental Economics KW - Criminology KW - Models of Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior KW - Positive Analysis of Policy-Making and Implementation KW - Renewable Resources and Conservation: Government Policy KW - Bureaucracy KW - Administrative Processes in Public Organizations KW - Corruption KW - Environmental Economics: General KW - Education: General KW - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue: General KW - Tax Evasion and Avoidance KW - Corporate crime KW - white-collar crime KW - Public finance & taxation KW - Environmental economics KW - Education KW - Environment KW - Legal support in revenue administration KW - Tax evasion KW - Crime KW - Revenue administration KW - Environmental sciences KW - Revenue KW - United States UR - https://www.unicat.be/uniCat?func=search&query=sysid:84542124 AB - This paper examines the reasons why corruption and policy distortions tend to exhibit a high degree of persistence in certain regimes. We identify circumstances under which a firm seeks to evade regulations by (1) bribing of local inspectors, and (2) lobbying high-level government politicians to resist legal reforms designed to improve judicial efficiency and eliminate corruption. The analysis predicts that in politically unstable regimes, the institutions necessary to monitor and enforce compliance are weak. In such countries, corruption is more pervasive and the compliance with regulations is low. The empirical results support the predictions of the model. ER -