TY - BOOK ID - 84541735 TI - Hierarchy and Authority in a Dynamic Perspective : A Model Applied to Donor Financing of NGO Proposals PY - 2003 SN - 1462395279 1452731039 128203944X 1451902654 9786613797018 PB - Washington, D.C. : International Monetary Fund, DB - UniCat KW - Financial Risk Management KW - Industries: Financial Services KW - NGOs (Non-Governmental Organizations) KW - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory: General KW - Organizational Behavior KW - Transaction Costs KW - Property Rights KW - Asymmetric and Private Information KW - Organization of Production KW - Nonprofit Institutions KW - NGOs KW - Social Entrepreneurship KW - Debt KW - Debt Management KW - Sovereign Debt KW - Banks KW - Depository Institutions KW - Micro Finance Institutions KW - Mortgages KW - Civil service & public sector KW - Finance KW - Nongovernmental organizations KW - Debt limits KW - Project loans KW - Economic sectors KW - Asset and liability management KW - Financial institutions KW - Non-governmental organizations KW - Loans KW - Belgium KW - Ngos (Non-Governmental Organizations) KW - Ngos UR - https://www.unicat.be/uniCat?func=search&query=sysid:84541735 AB - This paper presents a dynamic game of strategic delegation between a principal and an agent. The principal can choose between two organizational designs: a traditional hierarchy where she retains authority over the choice of projects to be implemented or a delegation where she allows her agent to select the project. The key objectives of this model are to identify the long-run determinants of the principal’s choice and verify the impact of the authority allocation on the agent’s effort levels and on the principal’s payoffs. We apply the model to the relationships between institutional donors and nongovernmental organizations. ER -