TY - BOOK ID - 84541254 TI - The Persistence of Corruption and Slow Economic Growth PY - 2002 SN - 1462359752 1452741964 1282558269 1451919549 9786613822390 PB - Washington, D.C. : International Monetary Fund, DB - UniCat KW - Political corruption KW - Boss rule KW - Corruption (in politics) KW - Graft in politics KW - Malversation KW - Political scandals KW - Politics, Practical KW - Corruption KW - Misconduct in office KW - Economic aspects. KW - Corrupt practices KW - Labor KW - Macroeconomics KW - Public Finance KW - Criminology KW - Illegal Behavior and the Enforcement of Law KW - Formal and Informal Sectors KW - Shadow Economy KW - Institutional Arrangements KW - Bureaucracy KW - Administrative Processes in Public Organizations KW - National Government Expenditures and Related Policies: General KW - Labor Economics: General KW - Public Enterprises KW - Public-Private Enterprises KW - Employment KW - Unemployment KW - Wages KW - Intergenerational Income Distribution KW - Aggregate Human Capital KW - Aggregate Labor Productivity KW - Corporate crime KW - white-collar crime KW - Public finance & taxation KW - Labour KW - income economics KW - Civil service & public sector KW - Expenditure KW - Public sector KW - Civil service KW - Crime KW - Economic sectors KW - Expenditures, Public KW - Labor economics KW - Finance, Public KW - Haiti UR - https://www.unicat.be/uniCat?func=search&query=sysid:84541254 AB - There is increasing recognition that corruption has substantial, adverse effects on economic growth. But if the costs of corruption are so high, why don’t countries strive to improve their institutions and root out corruption? Why do many countries appear to be stuck in a vicious circle of widespread corruption and low economic growth, often accompanied by ever-changing governments through revolutions and coups? A possible explanation is that when corruption is widespread, individuals do not have incentives to fight it even if everybody would be better off without it. Two models involving strategic complementarities and multiple equilibria attempt to illustrate this formally. ER -