TY - BOOK ID - 84540929 TI - Controlling Fiscal Corruption AU - Chand, Sheetal. AU - Moene, Karl. PY - 1997 SN - 1462394345 1451989458 1281601632 9786613782328 1451898029 PB - Washington, D.C. : International Monetary Fund, DB - UniCat KW - Labor KW - Taxation KW - Criminology KW - Firm Behavior KW - Criteria for Decision-Making under Risk and Uncertainty KW - Fiscal Policy KW - Nonwage Labor Costs and Benefits KW - Private Pensions KW - Illegal Behavior and the Enforcement of Law KW - Formal and Informal Sectors KW - Shadow Economy KW - Institutional Arrangements KW - Bureaucracy KW - Administrative Processes in Public Organizations KW - Corruption KW - Tax Evasion and Avoidance KW - Personal Income and Other Nonbusiness Taxes and Subsidies KW - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue: General KW - Employment KW - Unemployment KW - Wages KW - Intergenerational Income Distribution KW - Aggregate Human Capital KW - Aggregate Labor Productivity KW - Labour KW - income economics KW - Public finance & taxation KW - Corporate crime KW - white-collar crime KW - Civil service & public sector KW - Bonuses KW - Tax evasion KW - Income and capital gains taxes KW - Tax administration core functions KW - Crime KW - Revenue administration KW - Civil service KW - Employee fringe benefits KW - Income tax KW - Tax administration and procedure KW - Ghana UR - https://www.unicat.be/uniCat?func=search&query=sysid:84540929 AB - This paper examines the issue of controlling fiscal corruption by providing incentives to fiscal officers. First, a case study of a successful attack on corruption is presented that shows the importance of attending to the conditions of service of fiscal officers. Second, a model is developed drawing on the conclusions of the case study that shows their consistency with optimization behavior. It confirms that simply providing bonuses is not enough. Corruption at higher levels of management has to be contained so as to allow bonuses to become more effective, and thereby to initiate a virtuous circle. ER -