TY - BOOK ID - 84539332 TI - Auction Format Matters : Evidenceon Bidding Behavior and Seller Revenue AU - Feldman, Robert. AU - Reinhart, Vincent. PY - 1995 SN - 146238434X 1455245437 1281602698 1455207993 9786613783387 PB - Washington, D.C. : International Monetary Fund, DB - UniCat KW - Investments: Metals KW - Finance: General KW - Macroeconomics KW - Simulation Methods KW - Auctions KW - Metals and Metal Products KW - Cement KW - Glass KW - Ceramics KW - General Financial Markets: General (includes Measurement and Data) KW - Investment & securities KW - Finance KW - Gold KW - Commodity markets KW - Gold prices KW - Commodities KW - Financial markets KW - Prices KW - Commodity exchanges KW - United States UR - https://www.unicat.be/uniCat?func=search&query=sysid:84539332 AB - This paper evaluates the importance of auction format on bidding behavior and seller revenue, focusing on differences in performance under uniform-price and discriminatory-price formats. The analysis is based on a standard benchmark model from which empirically-testable hypotheses are derived on the optimal amount of bid shading that generates revenue equivalence between the two formats. Applying this model to data from the IMF gold auctions run in 1976-80, we find evidence of statistically significant shading in excess of the theoretically-derived optimum under the discriminatory format. This evidence suggests greater seller revenue under the uniform-price format. ER -