TY - BOOK ID - 8061089 TI - Assessment of the nuclear programs of Iran and North Korea PY - 2013 SN - 9400760183 9400796498 9400760191 PB - Dordrecht ; New York : Springer, DB - UniCat KW - Nuclear engineering. KW - Nuclear nonproliferation. KW - Nuclear weapons -- Iran. KW - Nuclear weapons -- Korea (North). KW - Military & Naval Science KW - Political Science KW - Law, Politics & Government KW - Military Science - General KW - Political Science - General KW - Nuclear weapons KW - Export of nuclear materials KW - Export of nuclear technology KW - International control of nuclear energy KW - Nonproliferation, Nuclear KW - Nuclear energy KW - Nuclear exports KW - Nuclear proliferation KW - Proliferation, Nuclear KW - International control KW - Political science. KW - Nuclear energy. KW - Social policy. KW - Political Science and International Relations. KW - Political Science. KW - Social Policy. KW - Nuclear Energy. KW - Nuclear Engineering. KW - Nuclear arms control KW - Nuclear-weapon-free zones KW - National planning KW - State planning KW - Economic policy KW - Family policy KW - Social history KW - Administration KW - Civil government KW - Commonwealth, The KW - Government KW - Political theory KW - Political thought KW - Politics KW - Science, Political KW - Social sciences KW - State, The KW - Atomic energy KW - Atomic power KW - Energy, Atomic KW - Energy, Nuclear KW - Nuclear power KW - Power, Atomic KW - Power, Nuclear KW - Force and energy KW - Nuclear physics KW - Power resources KW - Nuclear engineering KW - Nuclear facilities KW - Nuclear power plants UR - https://www.unicat.be/uniCat?func=search&query=sysid:8061089 AB - When we are looking at proliferation cases, there are a number of lessons – positive and negative – learnt. First, facts reported by the IAEA are essential for the international community in assessing the compliance and risks of possible clandestine activities. Second, the IAEA verification scheme is biting when it fully exercises its verification rights, and when it is provided with the requisite cooperation. Third, when countries face questions raised by the IAEA, those that chose to turn the course and / or cooperated to remove concerns and ambiguities resolved their nuclear dossiers in a satisfactory manner and fairly swiftly. Fourth, when states adopt the course of confrontation, as are currently the cases with Iran, Syria and North Korea, the situation becomes more complicated and more difficult to resolve. Fifth, dragging non-compliance and challenging of the authority of the United Nations Security Council and the IAEA Board of Governors erodes the international non-proliferation regime. This book addresses two proliferation cases, Iran and North Korea providing extensive snapshots on the currently known nuclear programs, and analyses failures and weaknesses of past verification activities, and makes innovative suggestions for ways forward. ER -