TY - BOOK ID - 792147 TI - International government finance and the Amsterdam capital market, 1740-1815 PY - 1980 SN - 0521226775 0521101107 0511759703 PB - Cambridge : Cambridge University Press, DB - UniCat KW - History of the Netherlands KW - anno 1800-1899 KW - anno 1700-1799 KW - Amsterdam KW - Loans, Dutch KW - Capital KW - International finance KW - Prêts hollandais KW - Finances internationales KW - History KW - Histoire KW - 336.76 KW - -336.3 KW - 338 <09> KW - -Loans, Dutch KW - -NL / Netherlands - Nederland - Pays Bas KW - 331.162.1 KW - Dutch loans KW - International monetary system KW - International money KW - Finance KW - International economic relations KW - Capital assets KW - Fixed assets KW - Economics KW - Capitalism KW - Infrastructure (Economics) KW - Wealth KW - Beurswezen. Geldmarkt. Valutamarkt. Binnenlandse geldmarkt. Valutamarkt KW - Nationale schulden. Staatsschulden. Openbare schulden. Staatslening. Staatsfondsen. Staatsbankroet KW - Economische geschiedenis KW - Geschiedenis van de financiële markten. KW - History. KW - 338 <09> Economische geschiedenis KW - 336.3 Nationale schulden. Staatsschulden. Openbare schulden. Staatslening. Staatsfondsen. Staatsbankroet KW - 336.76 Beurswezen. Geldmarkt. Valutamarkt. Binnenlandse geldmarkt. Valutamarkt KW - Prêts hollandais KW - NL / Netherlands - Nederland - Pays Bas KW - 336.3 KW - Geschiedenis van de financiële markten KW - Arts and Humanities UR - https://www.unicat.be/uniCat?func=search&query=sysid:792147 AB - During the eighteenth century European governments began systematically using an international credit structure whose centre was the Amsterdam capital market. This book reconstructs that system and surveys its principal effects on the European and especially the Dutch economies. Eighteenth-century states borrowed chiefly to finance wars and, increasingly toward the century's end, debts from earlier wars. Military and naval spending and debt service together consumed up to eighty percent of peacetime revenues and more in war. Borrowing on international markets stabilised previously disruptive deficit financing techniques and moderated the economic consequences of sharply irregular war spending. This development however, eased the problems of war-making more than it developed national economies or enhanced prosperity. The Dutch, heretofore seen as having squandered the advantage of cheap credit, actually faced the difficult problem of finding productive uses for their savings at satisfactory returns. ER -