TY - BOOK ID - 7913080 TI - Fair revenue sharing mechanisms for strategic passenger airline alliances PY - 2013 SN - 3642358217 3642358225 PB - Berlin ; Heidelberg : Springer-Verlag, DB - UniCat KW - Airlines -- Reservation systems. KW - Real-time data processing. KW - Revenue management. KW - Management KW - Business & Economics KW - Management Theory KW - Revenue sharing KW - Airlines KW - Mathematical models. KW - Finance. KW - Air carriers KW - Air lines KW - Air transportation industry KW - Airline industry KW - Aviation industry KW - Scheduled airlines KW - Federal-state program swaps KW - State-federal program swaps KW - Tax sharing KW - Turnback of federal programs to states KW - Business. KW - Production management. KW - Operations research. KW - Decision making. KW - Management science. KW - Game theory. KW - Business and Management. KW - Operation Research/Decision Theory. KW - Operations Research, Management Science. KW - Game Theory. KW - Operations Management. KW - Aeronautics, Commercial KW - Airways KW - Intergovernmental fiscal relations KW - Intergovernmental tax relations KW - Urban policy KW - Operations Research/Decision Theory. KW - Manufacturing management KW - Industrial management KW - Games, Theory of KW - Theory of games KW - Mathematical models KW - Mathematics KW - Operational analysis KW - Operational research KW - Industrial engineering KW - Management science KW - Research KW - System theory KW - Quantitative business analysis KW - Problem solving KW - Operations research KW - Statistical decision KW - Deciding KW - Decision (Psychology) KW - Decision analysis KW - Decision processes KW - Making decisions KW - Management decisions KW - Choice (Psychology) KW - Decision making UR - https://www.unicat.be/uniCat?func=search&query=sysid:7913080 AB - A major problem arising in airline alliances is to design allocation mechanisms determining how the revenue of a product should be shared among the airlines. The nucleolus is a concept of cooperative game theory that provides solutions for allocating the cost or benefit of a cooperation. This work provides fair revenue proportions for the airline alliances based on the nucleolus, which assumes a centralized decision making system. The proposed mechanism is used as a benchmark to evaluate the fairness of the revenue sharing mechanisms, where the alliance partners behave selfishly. Additionally, a new selfish revenue allocation rule is developed that improves the performance of the existing methods. ER -