TY - BOOK ID - 78643828 TI - Deepwater Horizon AU - Boebert, Earl AU - Blossom, James PY - 2016 SN - 0674545249 0674545265 9780674545267 9780674545236 0674545230 PB - Cambridge, Massachusetts DB - UniCat KW - BP Deepwater Horizon Explosion and Oil Spill, 2010. KW - Deepwater Horizon (Drilling rig) KW - Offshore oil well drilling KW - Oil wells KW - Wells, Oil KW - Gas wells KW - Oil fields KW - Petroleum engineering KW - Offshore drilling for oil KW - Offshore oil operations KW - Oil well drilling, Submarine KW - Ocean mining KW - Oil well drilling KW - Petroleum in submerged lands KW - Oil well drilling rigs KW - BP Deepwater Horizon Explosion and Oil Spill, 2010 KW - BP Drilling Rig Explosion, 2010 KW - BP Oil Spill, 2010 KW - Deepwater Horizon Explosion and Oil Spill, 2010 KW - Gulf Drilling Rig Explosion, 2010 KW - Gulf of Mexico Drilling Rig Explosion, 2010 KW - Gulf of Mexico Oil Spill, 2010 KW - Gulf Oil Spill, 2010 KW - Mexico, Gulf of, Drilling Rig Explosion, 2010 KW - Mexico, Gulf of, Oil Spill, 2010 KW - Drilling platforms KW - Oil spills KW - Accidents KW - Blowouts. KW - Prevention. KW - Safety measures. KW - Blowouts KW - Accidents&delete& KW - Prevention KW - Safety measures KW - Blowouts&delete& KW - E-books UR - https://www.unicat.be/uniCat?func=search&query=sysid:78643828 AB - On April 20, 2010, the crew of the floating drill rig Deepwater Horizon lost control of the Macondo oil well forty miles offshore in the Gulf of Mexico. Escaping gas and oil ignited, destroying the rig, killing eleven crew members, and injuring dozens more. The emergency spiraled into the worst human-made economic and ecological disaster in Gulf Coast history. Senior systems engineers Earl Boebert and James Blossom offer the most comprehensive account to date of BP’s Deepwater Horizon oil spill. Sifting through a mountain of evidence generated by the largest civil trial in U.S. history, the authors challenge the commonly accepted explanation that the crew, operating under pressure to cut costs, made mistakes that were compounded by the failure of a key safety device. This explanation arose from legal, political, and public relations maneuvering over the billions of dollars in damages that were ultimately paid to compensate individuals and local businesses and repair the environment. But as this book makes clear, the blowout emerged from corporate and engineering decisions which, while individually innocuous, combined to create the disaster. Rather than focusing on blame, Boebert and Blossom use the complex interactions of technology, people, and procedures involved in the high-consequence enterprise of offshore drilling to illustrate a systems approach which contributes to a better understanding of how similar disasters emerge and how they can be prevented. ER -