TY - BOOK ID - 5233626 TI - Deregulatory takings and the regulatory contract : the competitive transformation of network industries in the United States AU - Sidak, J. Gregory AU - Spulber, Daniel F. PY - 1997 SN - 0521591597 0521658713 0511572220 9780521591591 9780511572227 9780521658713 PB - Cambridge: Cambridge university press, DB - UniCat KW - Telecommunication KW - Electric utilities KW - Public utilities KW - Right of property KW - Breach of contract KW - Télécommunications KW - Services publics d'électricité KW - Services publics KW - Droit de propriété KW - Inexécution KW - Deregulation KW - Law and legislation KW - Déréglementation KW - Droit KW - Télécommunications KW - Services publics d'électricité KW - Droit de propriété KW - Inexécution KW - Déréglementation KW - Business, Economy and Management KW - Economics KW - Industrial economics KW - Public economics KW - Telecommunication services KW - United States KW - Telecommunication - Deregulation - United States KW - Telecommunication - Law and legislation - United States KW - Electric utilities - Deregulation - United States KW - Electric utilities - Law and legislation - United States KW - Public utilities - Deregulation - United States KW - Public utilities - Law and legislation - United States KW - Right of property - United States KW - Breach of contract - United States KW - Economic liberties (U.S. Constitution) KW - Municipal utilities KW - Public-service corporations (Public utilities) KW - Utilities, Public KW - Utility companies KW - Municipal franchises KW - United States of America UR - https://www.unicat.be/uniCat?func=search&query=sysid:5233626 AB - This 1998 book addresses deregulatory policies that threaten to reduce or destroy the value of private property in network industries without any accompanying payment of just compensation, policies that are termed 'deregulatory takings'. The authors further consider the problem of renegotiation of the regulatory contract, which changes the terms and conditions of operation of utility companies. They argue that constitutional protections of private property from takings, as well as efficient remedies for contractual breach, provide the proper foundation for the competitive transformation of the network industries. The benefits of competition do not stem from government regulations that redistribute income from utility investors to customers, nor do such benefits stem from regulatory policies for network access that promote free riding on incumbent facilities by entrants. Such actions represent a new version of increased regulation, not deregulation. ER -