TY - BOOK ID - 475984 TI - Why Adjudicate? PY - 2012 SN - 1280494115 9786613589347 1400842514 9781400842513 9781280494116 6613589349 9780691152752 0691152756 9780691152769 0691152764 PB - Princeton, NJ DB - UniCat KW - Foreign trade regulation. KW - Administrative procedure. KW - Adjective administrative law KW - Adjudication, Administrative KW - Administrative adjudication KW - Administrative procedure KW - Administrative rule making KW - Regulatory reform KW - Rule making, Administrative KW - Procedure (Law) KW - Export and import controls KW - Foreign trade control KW - Foreign trade regulation KW - Import and export controls KW - International trade KW - International trade control KW - International trade regulation KW - Prohibited exports and imports KW - Trade regulation KW - Law and legislation KW - World Trade Organization. KW - Biśva Bāṇijya Saṃsthā KW - Dėlkhiĭn Khudaldaany Baĭguullaga KW - DTÖ KW - Dünya Ticaret Örgütü KW - Munaẓẓamat al-Tijārah al-ʻĀlamīyah KW - O.M.C. KW - OMC KW - ʻOngkān Kānkhā Lōk KW - Organisation mondiale du commerce KW - Organização Mundial do Comércio KW - Organización Mundial de Comercio KW - Organización Mundial del Comercio KW - Organizația Mondială de Comerț KW - Organizzazione mondiale del commercio KW - Organizzazione mondiale per il commercio KW - Qaṅgkār Bāṇijjakamm Bibhab Lok KW - Sāzmān-i Tijārat-i Jahānī KW - Shi jie mao yi zu zhi KW - SOT KW - Světová obchodní organizace KW - Svitova orhanizat︠s︡ii︠a︡ torhivli KW - Światowa Organizacja Handlu KW - Tổ chức thương mại thế giới KW - Viśva Vyapāra Saṅgaṭhana KW - Vsemirnai︠a︡ torgovai︠a︡ organizat︠s︡ii︠a︡ KW - VTO KW - W.T.O. KW - Welthandelsorganisation KW - World Trade Organisation KW - WTO KW - منظمة التجارة العالمية KW - 世界貿易組織 KW - 世界贸易组织 KW - General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (Organization) KW - E-books KW - Political sociology KW - Foreign trade policy KW - China. KW - Japan. KW - Japanese trade policy. KW - Peru. KW - U.S. Congress. KW - U.S. trade policy. KW - United States. KW - Vietnam. KW - WTO. KW - accountability. KW - adjudication. KW - bargaining. KW - bureaucracy. KW - conflict. KW - cooperation. KW - courts. KW - delegation of authority. KW - democracy. KW - democratic politics. KW - developing countries. KW - dispute settlement. KW - domestic constraints. KW - domestic politics. KW - exports. KW - foreign economic policy. KW - free trade. KW - geopolitics. KW - industry lobbying. KW - international politics. KW - international relations. KW - international trade law. KW - international trade. KW - labeling. KW - legalization. KW - liberalization. KW - politicization. KW - trade barriers. KW - trade disputes. KW - trade law enforcement. KW - trade policy. KW - trade. UR - https://www.unicat.be/uniCat?func=search&query=sysid:475984 AB - The World Trade Organization (WTO) oversees the negotiation and enforcement of formal rules governing international trade. Why do countries choose to adjudicate their trade disputes in the WTO rather than settling their differences on their own? In Why Adjudicate?, Christina Davis investigates the domestic politics behind the filing of WTO complaints and reveals why formal dispute settlement creates better outcomes for governments and their citizens. Davis demonstrates that industry lobbying, legislative demands, and international politics influence which countries and cases appear before the WTO. Democratic checks and balances bias the trade policy process toward public lawsuits and away from informal settlements. Trade officials use legal complaints to manage domestic politics and defend trade interests. WTO dispute settlement enables states and domestic groups to signal resolve more effectively, thereby enhancing the information available to policymakers and reducing the risk of a trade war. Davis establishes her argument with data on trade disputes and landmark cases, including the Boeing-Airbus controversy over aircraft subsidies, disagreement over Chinese intellectual property rights, and Japan's repeated challenges of U.S. steel industry protection. In her analysis of foreign trade barriers against U.S. exports, Davis explains why the United States gains better outcomes for cases taken to formal dispute settlement than for those negotiated. Case studies of Peru and Vietnam show that legal action can also benefit developing countries. ER -