TY - BOOK ID - 27995520 TI - The political economy of public administration : institutional choice in the public sector PY - 1995 SN - 0521484367 0521482011 0511528167 9780521484367 PB - Cambridge : Cambridge University Press, DB - UniCat KW - #SBIB:35H006 KW - #SBIB:35H300 KW - #SBIB:IO KW - Bestuurswetenschappen: theorieën KW - Organisatieleer: algemene werken KW - Administrative agencies KW - Executive departments KW - Government business enterprises KW - Independent regulatory commissions KW - Public administration KW - Transaction costs KW - Cost KW - Externalities (Economics) KW - Right of property KW - Commissions, Independent regulatory KW - Commissions of the federal government KW - Independent administrative agencies KW - Independent agencies KW - Quasi-judicial agencies KW - Regulatory agencies KW - Regulatory commissions KW - Administrative law KW - Insurance commissioners KW - Nationalized companies KW - Parastatals KW - Public enterprises KW - State-owned enterprises KW - Business enterprises KW - Departments, Executive KW - Government ministries KW - Ministries, Government KW - Ministries, State KW - State ministries KW - Agencies, Administrative KW - Executive agencies KW - Government agencies KW - Administration, Public KW - Delivery of government services KW - Government services, Delivery of KW - Public management KW - Public sector management KW - Political science KW - Decentralization in government KW - Local government KW - Public officers KW - Law and legislation KW - Sociology of organization KW - Public administration. KW - Transaction costs. KW - Administrative agencies. KW - Executive departments. KW - Independent regulatory commissions. KW - Government business enterprises. KW - Administration publique KW - Ministères KW - Entreprises publiques KW - Commissions de réglementation autonomes KW - Administration publique (Science) KW - Frais de transaction KW - Social Sciences KW - Political Science UR - https://www.unicat.be/uniCat?func=search&query=sysid:27995520 AB - This book applies the basic ideas and models of economics to develop a single transactions framework to explain the key institutional arrangements across the whole range of public sector organization: the regulatory commission, the executive tax-financed bureau, and the state-owned enterprise. This book also explores the link between agency form and administrative function, agency independence from the legislature, the rights extended to private interests to influence administrative decision making, the role of civil service arrangements that are so often seen as simply frustrating efficiency and responsiveness, and the boundary between public and private sectors. This book should be of value to those with a practical interest in public administration as well as students of political science, public administration, economics, and public policy. ER -