TY - BOOK ID - 2737943 TI - Functional models of cognition : self-organizing dynamics and semantic structures in cognitive systems PY - 2000 VL - 27 SN - 0792360729 9048153603 9401596204 PB - Dordrecht ; Boston ; London Kluwer academic publishers DB - UniCat KW - Cognitie KW - Cognitieve wetenschap KW - Cognition KW - Cognitive science KW - Sciences cognitives KW - Wetenschap [Cognitieve ] KW - Cognition. KW - Cognitive science. KW - Cognitive psychology. KW - System theory. KW - Computers. KW - Artificial intelligence. KW - Epistemology. KW - Cognitive Psychology. KW - Systems Theory, Control. KW - Theory of Computation. KW - Artificial Intelligence. KW - Epistemology KW - Theory of knowledge KW - Philosophy KW - Psychology KW - AI (Artificial intelligence) KW - Artificial thinking KW - Electronic brains KW - Intellectronics KW - Intelligence, Artificial KW - Intelligent machines KW - Machine intelligence KW - Thinking, Artificial KW - Bionics KW - Digital computer simulation KW - Electronic data processing KW - Logic machines KW - Machine theory KW - Self-organizing systems KW - Simulation methods KW - Fifth generation computers KW - Neural computers KW - Automatic computers KW - Automatic data processors KW - Computer hardware KW - Computing machines (Computers) KW - Electronic calculating-machines KW - Electronic computers KW - Hardware, Computer KW - Computer systems KW - Cybernetics KW - Calculators KW - Cyberspace KW - Systems, Theory of KW - Systems science KW - Science KW - Psychology, Cognitive UR - https://www.unicat.be/uniCat?func=search&query=sysid:2737943 AB - Our ontology as well as our grammar are, as Quine affirms, ineliminable parts of our conceptual contribution to our theory of the world. It seems impossible to think of enti­ ties, individuals and events without specifying and constructing, in advance, a specific language that must be used in order to speak about these same entities. We really know only insofar as we regiment our system of the world in a consistent and adequate way. At the level of proper nouns and existence functions we have, for instance, a standard form of a regimented language whose complementary apparatus consists of predicates, variables, quantifiers and truth functions. If, for instance, the discoveries in the field of Quantum Mechanics should oblige us, in the future, to abandon the traditional logic of truth functions, the very notion of existence, as established until now, will be chal­ lenged. These considerations, as developed by Quine, introduce us to a conceptual perspective like the "internal realist" perspective advocated by Putnam whose principal aim is, for cer­ tain aspects, to link the philosophical approaches developed respectively by Quine and Wittgenstein. Actually, Putnam conservatively extends the approach to the problem of ref­ erence outlined by Quine: in his opinion, to talk of "facts" without specifying the language to be used is to talk of nothing. ER -