TY - BOOK ID - 2706311 TI - Shapes of forms : from gestalt psychology and phenomenology to ontology and mathematics PY - 1999 VL - 275 SN - 0792352467 9048150981 9401729905 9780792352464 PB - Dordrecht ; Boston : Kluwer Academic, DB - UniCat KW - Form (Philosophy) KW - Form discrimination KW - Form perception KW - Forme (Philosophie) KW - Perceptie der vormen KW - Perception des formes KW - Shape discrimination KW - Vorm (Filosofie) KW - Vormen--Perceptie KW - Vormen--Waarneming KW - Knowledge, Theory of KW - Gestalt psychology KW - Phenomenology KW - Ontology KW - Mathematics KW - Théorie de la connaissance KW - Gestaltpsychologie KW - Phénoménologie KW - Ontologie KW - Mathématiques KW - Congresses KW - Philosophy KW - Congrès KW - Philosophie KW - Forme (philosophie) KW - Form perception. KW - Théorie de la connaissance KW - Phénoménologie KW - Mathématiques KW - Congrès KW - Shape perception KW - Perception des formes. KW - Idealism KW - Matter KW - Metaphysics KW - Structuralism KW - Perception KW - Visual perception KW - Figure-ground perception KW - Philosophy and science. KW - Psycholinguistics. KW - Language and languages—Philosophy. KW - Phenomenology . KW - Philosophy of Science. KW - Philosophy of Language. KW - Phenomenology. KW - Philosophy, Modern KW - Language, Psychology of KW - Language and languages KW - Psychology of language KW - Speech KW - Linguistics KW - Psychology KW - Thought and thinking KW - Science and philosophy KW - Science KW - Psychological aspects UR - https://www.unicat.be/uniCat?func=search&query=sysid:2706311 AB - impossible triangle, after apprehension of the perceptively given mode of being of that 'object', the visual system assumes that all three sides touch on all three sides, whereas this happens on only one side. In fact, the sides touch only optically, because they are separate in depth. In Meinong's words, Penrose's triangle has been inserted in an 'objective', or in what we would today call a "cognitive schema". Re-examination of the Graz school's theory, as said, sheds light on several problems concerning the theory of perception, and, as Luccio points out in his contribution to this book, it helps to eliminate a number of over-simplistic commonplaces, such as the identification of the cognitivist notion of 'top down' with Wertheimer's 'von oben unten', and of 'bottom up' with his 'von unten nach oben'. In fact, neither Hochberg's and Gregory's 'concept-driven' perception nor Gibson's 'data-driven' perception coincide with the original conception of the Gestalt. ER -