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ID  - 21475875
TI  - Putting auction theory to work
PY  - 2007
SN  - 0521551846 0521536723 0511165439 9786613329165 0511166125 0511555709 0511813821 1283329166 0511164173 0511164971 1107713234 9780511164170 9780521551847 9780521536721 9780511166129 051116257X 9780511162572 9780511164972 9780511813825 9781283329163 9781107713239 6613329169 9780511165436 9780511555701
PB  - Cambridge Cambridge University Press
DB  - UniCat
KW  - Microeconomics
KW  - Auctions
KW  - Mathematical models
KW  - Mathematical models.
KW  - Business, Economy and Management
KW  - Economics
KW  - Privatization.
KW  - Denationalization
KW  - Privatisation
KW  - Contracting out
KW  - Corporatization
KW  - Government ownership
KW  - Dutch auctions
KW  - Vendues
KW  - Bailments
KW  - Commercial law
KW  - 303.8
KW  - 305.6
KW  - 305.971
KW  - AA / International- internationaal
KW  - Econometrische behandeling van een onderwerp
KW  - Risicotheorie, speltheorie. Risicokapitaal. Beslissingsmodellen
KW  - Speciale gevallen in econometrische modelbouw
KW  - Auction theory.
KW  - Game theory
KW  - Auctions - Mathematical models
KW  - Money market. Capital market
UR  - https://www.unicat.be/uniCat?func=search&query=sysid:21475875
AB  - This book provides a comprehensive introduction to modern auction theory and its important new applications. It is written by a leading economic theorist whose suggestions guided the creation of the new spectrum auction designs. Aimed at graduate students and professionals in economics, the book gives the most up-to-date treatments of both traditional theories of 'optimal auctions' and newer theories of multi-unit auctions and package auctions, and shows by example how these theories are used. The analysis explores the limitations of prominent older designs, such as the Vickrey auction design, and evaluates the practical responses to those limitations. It explores the tension between the traditional theory of auctions with a fixed set of bidders, in which the seller seeks to squeeze as much revenue as possible from the fixed set, and the theory of auctions with endogenous entry, in which bidder profits must be respected to encourage participation.
ER  -