TY - BOOK ID - 210448 TI - Action and responsibility PY - 2006 VL - v. 18 SN - 1280360658 9786610360659 1402039824 PB - Dordrecht : Springer, DB - UniCat KW - Act (Philosophy) KW - Responsibility. KW - Events (Philosophy) KW - Philosophy KW - Accountability KW - Moral responsibility KW - Obligation KW - Ethics KW - Supererogation KW - Action (Philosophy) KW - Agent (Philosophy) KW - Metaphysics. KW - Ethics. KW - Philosophy of mind. KW - Social sciences KW - Philosophy of Mind. KW - Philosophy of the Social Sciences. KW - Philosophy. KW - Social philosophy KW - Social theory KW - Mind, Philosophy of KW - Mind, Theory of KW - Theory of mind KW - Cognitive science KW - Metaphysics KW - Philosophical anthropology KW - Deontology KW - Ethics, Primitive KW - Ethology KW - Moral philosophy KW - Morality KW - Morals KW - Philosophy, Moral KW - Science, Moral KW - Values KW - God KW - Ontology KW - Philosophy of mind KW - Philosophy and social sciences. KW - Social sciences and philosophy UR - https://www.unicat.be/uniCat?func=search&query=sysid:210448 AB - What makes an event count as an action? Typical answers appeal to the way in which the event was produced: e.g., perhaps an arm movement is an action when caused by mental states (in particular ways), but not when caused in other ways. Andrew Sneddon argues that this type of answer, which he calls "productionism", is methodologically and substantially mistaken. In particular, productionist answers to this question tend to be either individualistic or foundationalist, or both, without explicit defence. Instead, Sneddon offers an externalist, anti-foundationalist account of what makes an event count as an action, which he calls neo-ascriptivism, after the work of H.L.A. Hart. Specifically, Sneddon argues that our practices of attributing moral responsibility to each other are at least partly constitutive of events as actions. ER -