TY - BOOK ID - 1716873 TI - The nature and authority of precedent PY - 2008 SN - 9780521713368 9780521885799 0521885795 0521713366 9780511818684 1107186587 9786611370572 0511394195 0511394845 0511390882 0511818688 1281370576 0511392117 0511393423 9780511394843 9780511393426 9780511392115 9781107186583 9781281370570 6611370579 9780511394195 9780511392115 9780511390883 PB - Cambridge : Cambridge University Press, DB - UniCat KW - Legal theory and methods. Philosophy of law KW - Stare decision KW - Law KW - Interpretation and construction KW - Judicial process KW - Judicial process. KW - Stare decisis KW - Stare decisis. KW - General and Others KW - Law - Interpretation and construction KW - Decision making, Judicial KW - Judicial behavior KW - Judicial decision making KW - Judges KW - Procedure (Law) KW - Precedents (Law) KW - Judgments KW - Legal certainty KW - Res judicata KW - Psychological aspects KW - Droit KW - Common law KW - Précédents (droit) KW - Case law KW - Sources UR - https://www.unicat.be/uniCat?func=search&query=sysid:1716873 AB - Neil Duxbury examines how precedents constrain legal decision-makers and how legal decision-makers relax and avoid those constraints. There is no single principle or theory which explains the authority of precedent but rather a number of arguments which raise rebuttable presumptions in favour of precedent-following. This book examines the force and the limitations of these arguments and shows that although the principal requirement of the doctrine of precedent is that courts respect earlier judicial decisions on materially identical facts, the doctrine also requires courts to depart from such decisions when following them would perpetuate legal error or injustice. Not only do judicial precedents not 'bind' judges in the classical-positivist sense, but, were they to do so, they would be ill suited to common-law decision-making. Combining historical inquiry and philosophical analysis, this book will assist anyone seeking to understand how precedent operates as a common-law doctrine. ER -