TY - THES ID - 147265859 TI - Modelling Imperfect Duties in Kantian Strategic Interaction AU - Roussel, Edward AU - Demey, Lorenz AU - KU Leuven. Hoger Instituut voor Wijsbegeerte. Opleiding Research Master of Philosophy (Leuven) PY - 2024 PB - Leuven KU Leuven. Hoger Instituut voor Wijsbegeerte DB - UniCat UR - https://www.unicat.be/uniCat?func=search&query=sysid:147265859 AB - How can we formally analyse strategic interaction in circumstances which constitute an imperfect duty? To answer that question, a game-theoretical framework, called the Kantian Normative Model (KNM), will be extended to be able to deal with the latitude of imperfect duties. Starting from an analysis of the nature of imperfect duties and an argument for the inadequacy of the Kantian normative model to deal with that type of duties, the new framework KNM+ of infinitely (partially-)repeated Kantian games will be constructed as an extension of KNM. It will be argued that the extended framework is able to adequately deal with imperfect duties, mqinly by including the temporal dimension of reasoning with imperfect duties. Throughout the paper, I will use (both as an example and as a ground for argumentation) Roussel and Demey's construction company case, which is represented as a prisoner's dilemma game including a strategy which constitutes an imperfect duty. ER -