TY - BOOK ID - 145908964 TI - Game Theory PY - 2021 PB - Basel, Switzerland MDPI - Multidisciplinary Digital Publishing Institute DB - UniCat KW - Research & information: general KW - Mathematics & science KW - pursuit KW - control functions KW - integral constraints KW - strategies KW - value of the game KW - decision-making KW - game theory KW - project management KW - differential games KW - cooperative differential games KW - Time Consistency KW - IDP-core KW - IDP dominance KW - two-sided platform market KW - pricing KW - Hotelling’s duopoly on the plane KW - Nash equilibrium KW - optimal location of platforms KW - prescribed duration KW - characteristic function KW - environmental resource management KW - pollution control KW - discrete-time games KW - cooperation KW - the core KW - linear transformation KW - time consistency KW - multistage game KW - chance moves KW - subgame perfect equilibria KW - cooperative trajectory KW - imputation distribution procedure KW - random time horizon KW - time until failure KW - discounted equilibrium KW - weibull distribution KW - chen distribution KW - equivalence principle KW - cooperative game KW - satisfaction criteria KW - proportional value KW - axiomatization KW - cooperative stochastic game KW - strong subgame consistency KW - core KW - dynamic games KW - multicriteria games KW - Nash bargaining solution KW - dynamic stability KW - rational behavior conditions KW - Shapley-Solidarity value KW - coalition structure KW - potential KW - bidding mechanism UR - https://www.unicat.be/uniCat?func=search&query=sysid:145908964 AB - The Special Issue “Game Theory” of the journal Mathematics provides a collection of papers that represent modern trends in mathematical game theory and its applications. The works address the problem of constructing and implementation of solution concepts based on classical optimality principles in different classes of games. In the case of non-cooperative behavior of players, the Nash equilibrium as a basic optimality principle is considered in both static and dynamic game settings. In the case of cooperative behavior of players, the situation is more complicated. As is seen from presented papers, the direct use of cooperative optimality principles in dynamic and differential games may bring time or subgame inconsistency of a solution which makes the cooperative schemes unsustainable. The notion of time or subgame consistency is crucial to the success of cooperation in a dynamic framework. In the works devoted to dynamic or differential games, this problem is analyzed and the special regularization procedures proposed to achieve time or subgame consistency of cooperative solutions. Among others, special attention in the presented book is paid to the construction of characteristic functions which determine the power of coalitions in games. The book contains many multi-disciplinary works applied to economic and environmental applications in a coherent manner. ER -