TY - BOOK ID - 138025765 TI - Should Credit Be Given for Autonomous Liberalization in Multilateral Trade Negotiations? AU - Mattoo, Aaditya AU - Olarreaga, Marcelo PY - 1999 PB - Washington, D.C., The World Bank, DB - UniCat KW - Currencies and Exchange Rates KW - Currency KW - Debt Markets KW - Dispute Settlement KW - Economic Theory and Research KW - Emerging Markets KW - Finance and Financial Sector Development KW - Free Trade KW - Insurance and Risk Mitigation KW - International Economics & Trade KW - International Trade and Trade Rules KW - Macroeconomics and Economic Growth KW - Multilateral Liberalization KW - Multilateral Negotiations KW - Private Sector Development KW - Public Sector Development KW - Reciprocal Concessions KW - Tariff KW - Tariff Reductions KW - Tariff Schedule KW - Tariffs KW - Terms Of Trade KW - Terms Of Trade Loss KW - Trade KW - Trade Liberalization KW - Trade Negotiations KW - Trade Policy KW - Unilateral Liberalization KW - Unilateral Reduction KW - Unilateral Tariff Reduction KW - World Trade KW - World Trade Organization UR - https://www.unicat.be/uniCat?func=search&query=sysid:138025765 AB - June 2000 - As each new round of multilateral trade negotiations approaches, there is a demand for a negotiating rule that would give credit for previous unilateral liberalization. The feasibility and desirability of such a rule depend on when it is instituted. As each new round of multilateral trade negotiations approaches, there is a demand for a negotiating rule that would give credit for autonomous (unilateral) liberalization. Mattoo and Olarreaga show that the feasibility and desirability of such a rule depend on when it is instituted. A credit rule established at the beginning of a round of negotiations has a primarily distributional effect, favoring those who have already undertaken liberalization. Implementing such a rule would depend on the generosity of those who have not liberalized. The authors propose instead establishing a credit rule at the end of a round of negotiations, which creates an ex ante assurance that any unilateral liberalization will receive credit in the next round. Such a rule would help induce or enhance liberalization in some countries between negotiating rounds by reducing the gains from retaining protection as negotiating currency. More strikingly, it could also lead to deeper levels of multilateral liberalization and induce other countries to go further than they would in the absence of a rule. Most important, such an ex ante rule would not rely on altruism to be generally acceptable. This paper - a product of Trade, Development Research Group - is part of a larger effort in the group to improve trade policy in goods and services. The authors may be contacted at amattoo@worldbank.org or molarreaga@worldbank.org. ER -