TY - BOOK ID - 136486464 TI - A Political Economy Theory of the Soft Budget Constraint AU - Robinson, James A. AU - Torvik, Ragnar. AU - National Bureau of Economic Research. PY - 2006 PB - Cambridge, Mass. National Bureau of Economic Research DB - UniCat UR - https://www.unicat.be/uniCat?func=search&query=sysid:136486464 AB - Why do soft budget constraints exist and persist? In this paper we argue that the prevalence of soft budget constraints can be best explained by the political desirability of softness. We develop a political economy model where politicians cannot commit to policies that are not ex post optimal. We show that because of the dynamic commitment problem inherent in the soft budget constraint, politicians can in essence commit to make transfers to entrepreneurs which otherwise they would not be able to do. This encourages such entrepreneurs to vote for them. Though the soft budget constraint may induce economic inefficiency, it may be politically rational because it influences the outcomes of elections. In consequence, even when information is complete, politicians may fund bad projects which they anticipate they will have to bail out in the future. ER -