TY - BOOK ID - 135109237 TI - Legislative malapportionment and institutional persistence AU - Bruhn, Miriam AU - Gallego, Francisco AU - Onorato, Massimiliano PY - 2010 PB - Washington, D.C., The World Bank, DB - UniCat KW - Democracies KW - Democratic regimes KW - Economic power KW - Elections KW - Electoral systems KW - Emerging Markets KW - Governance KW - Labor Policies KW - Legislation KW - Macroeconomics and Economic Growth KW - Parliamentary Government KW - Political Economy KW - Political groups KW - Political influence KW - Political representation KW - Political Systems and Analysis KW - Private Sector Development KW - Social Protections and Labor KW - Voting UR - https://www.unicat.be/uniCat?func=search&query=sysid:135109237 AB - This paper argues that legislative malapportionment, denoting a discrepancy between the share of legislative seats and the share of population held by electoral districts, serves as a tool for pre-democratic elites to preserve their political power and economic interests after a transition to democracy. The authors claim that legislative malapportionment enhances the pre-democratic elite's political influence by over-representing areas that are more likely to vote for parties aligned with the elite. This biased political representation survives in equilibrium as long as it helps democratic consolidation. Using data from Latin America, the authors document empirically that malapportionment increases the probability of transitioning to a democracy. Moreover, the data show that over-represented electoral districts are more likely to vote for parties close to pre-democracy ruling groups. The analysis also finds that overrepresented areas have lower levels of political competition and receive more transfers per capita from the central government, both of which favor the persistence of power of pre-democracy elites. ER -