TY - BOOK ID - 134269423 TI - The Political Economy of Healthcare Litigation : Model and Empirical Application to Uruguay AU - Corduneanu-Huci, Cristina AU - Hamilton, Alexander AU - Masses-Ferrer, Issel PY - 2011 PB - Washington, D.C., The World Bank, DB - UniCat KW - Economic Analysis of the Law KW - Health Economics KW - Health Economics & Finance KW - Health Law KW - Health Litigation KW - Health Monitoring & Evaluation KW - Health Systems Development & Reform KW - Health, Nutrition and Population KW - Macroeconomics and Economic Growth KW - Political Economy KW - Population Policies KW - Stakeholder Analysis UR - https://www.unicat.be/uniCat?func=search&query=sysid:134269423 AB - The political economy of health care is complex, as stakeholders have conflicting preferences over efficiency and equity. This paper formally models the preferences of consumer and producer groups involved in priority setting and judicialization in public health care. It uses a unique dataset of stakeholder perceptions, from Uruguay, to test whether these hypotheses are consistent with empirical evidence. The results suggest that the expectations of the political economy literature are supported: 1) regulators of public healthcare are less concerned with efficiency considerations than consumers; and 2) less organized groups are more concerned about equity than more organized interest groups. With respect to the consequences of health litigation, the findings are only partially consistent with the health care governance literature. Consumers perceive litigation as more beneficial than health care providers and regulators do. Counter-intuitively, powerful interest groups seem less willing to use litigation to shape policy outcomes. ER -