TY - BOOK ID - 11949861 TI - Corruption, Competition, and Contracts : A Model of Vote Buying AU - Vardy, Felix. AU - Morgan, John. AU - International Monetary Fund. AU - IMF Fund. PY - 2006 SN - 1451862717 1462311474 1451908075 9786613829115 1452738041 1283516667 PB - Washington, D.C. : International Monetary Fund, DB - UniCat KW - Competition. KW - Corruption. KW - Electronic books. -- local. KW - Social Welfare & Social Work KW - Social Sciences KW - Criminology, Penology & Juvenile Delinquency KW - Competition KW - Competition (Economics) KW - Competitiveness (Economics) KW - Economic competition KW - Corrupt practices KW - Economic aspects KW - Commerce KW - Conglomerate corporations KW - Covenants not to compete KW - Industrial concentration KW - Monopolies KW - Open price system KW - Supply and demand KW - Trusts, Industrial KW - Ethics KW - Finance: General KW - Taxation KW - Criminology KW - Social Choice KW - Clubs KW - Committees KW - Associations KW - Models of Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior KW - Positive Analysis of Policy-Making and Implementation KW - General Financial Markets: General (includes Measurement and Data) KW - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue: General KW - Bureaucracy KW - Administrative Processes in Public Organizations KW - Corruption KW - Finance KW - Public finance & taxation KW - Corporate crime KW - white-collar crime KW - Tax incentives KW - Financial markets KW - Crime KW - United Kingdom KW - White-collar crime UR - https://www.unicat.be/uniCat?func=search&query=sysid:11949861 AB - In the presence of competing interest groups, this paper examines how the form of votebuying contracts affects policy outcomes. We study contracts contingent upon individual votes, policy outcomes, and/or vote shares. Voters either care about their individual votes, or about the policy outcome. We find that vote buying is cheaper when what can be contracted upon coincides with what voters care about. Vote buying becomes extremely costly, or even impossible, when there is no such coincidence. Finally, vote buying is extremely cheap, or even free, when contracts can be contingent upon both individual votes and vote shares. ER -