TY - BOOK ID - 11276433 TI - Towards a Principal-Agent Based Typology of Risks in Public-Private Partnerships AU - De Palma, André. AU - Leruth, Luc. AU - Prunier, Guillaume. AU - International Monetary Fund. PY - 2009 SN - 1451917503 1462341640 1282843885 1451873247 9786612843884 1452760152 PB - Washington, D.C. : International Monetary Fund, DB - UniCat KW - Management KW - Business & Economics KW - Industrial Management KW - Public-private sector cooperation. KW - Privatization. KW - Risk management. KW - Denationalization KW - Privatisation KW - Private-public partnerships KW - Private-public sector cooperation KW - Public-private partnerships KW - Public-private sector collaboration KW - Insurance KW - Contracting out KW - Corporatization KW - Government ownership KW - Cooperation KW - Infrastructure KW - Macroeconomics KW - Public Finance KW - Organizational Behavior KW - Transaction Costs KW - Property Rights KW - Bureaucracy KW - Administrative Processes in Public Organizations KW - Corruption KW - Asymmetric and Private Information KW - National Government Expenditures and Related Policies: Infrastructures KW - Other Public Investment and Capital Stock KW - Marketing and Advertising: Government Policy and Regulation KW - Transportation Systems: Government and Private Investment Analysis KW - Public Enterprises KW - Public-Private Enterprises KW - Public Administration KW - Public Sector Accounting and Audits KW - Industry Studies: Transportation and Utilities: General KW - Public finance & taxation KW - Civil service & public sector KW - Public investment and public-private partnerships (PPP) KW - Public sector KW - Risks of public-private partnership KW - Transportation KW - Expenditure KW - Economic sectors KW - Public financial management (PFM) KW - National accounts KW - Public-private sector cooperation KW - Finance, Public KW - Fiscal policy KW - Saving and investment KW - United States UR - https://www.unicat.be/uniCat?func=search&query=sysid:11276433 AB - There is a strong economic rationale for close cooperation between the public and private sectors. This has resulted in a significant increase in the demand for the provision of public services through instruments combining public and private money such as public-private partnerships (PPPs or P3s). We describe these arrangements and explore how they can be analyzed using standard tools in economics (incentives and principal-agent theory). We discuss the implications of our approach in terms of identifying risks that are often overlooked before turining to the optimal risk-sharing between the public and private partners, in particular with respect to information asymmetries in risk perceptions. This allows us to propose a typology of the risks associated with PPPs, where both internal risks (the risks associated with the contract) and external risks (those associated with the project) are considered. ER -