TY - BOOK ID - 11265539 TI - A principal-agent theory approach to public expenditure management systems in developing countries AU - Leruth, Luc. AU - Paul, Elisabeth. PY - 2006 SN - 1451864647 1462388140 1451993234 9786613824592 1451988346 1283512149 PB - [Washington, D.C.] : International Monetary Fund, DB - UniCat KW - Electronic books. -- local. KW - Expenditures, Public -- Developing countries. KW - Government spending policy -- Management -- Developing countries. KW - Political Science KW - Law, Politics & Government KW - Public Finance KW - Government spending policy KW - Expenditures, Public KW - Management KW - Appropriations and expenditures KW - Government appropriations KW - Government expenditures KW - Government spending KW - Public expenditures KW - Public spending KW - Spending, Government KW - Public spending policy KW - Spending policy, Government KW - Government policy KW - Finance, Public KW - Public administration KW - Economic policy KW - Full employment policies KW - Unfunded mandates KW - Taxation KW - Auditing KW - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue: General KW - National Government Expenditures and Related Policies: General KW - Public Administration KW - Public Sector Accounting and Audits KW - Management accounting & bookkeeping KW - Public finance & taxation KW - Expenditure KW - External audit KW - Internal controls KW - Tax incentives KW - Revenue KW - France UR - https://www.unicat.be/uniCat?func=search&query=sysid:11265539 AB - A well-functioning public expenditure management (PEM) system is considered a critical pillar of government efficiency, on par with a low-distortion tax system and efficient tax administration. The paper discusses PEM systems in developing countries using an analytical framework based on principal-agent theory. This simple model can be applied to various PEM systems, and allows for comparisons between institutional settings. To illustrate this, we analyze the benefits derived from the use by the Ministry of Finance (MoF) of two control instruments; ex post audits and ex ante controls, and assess their value in terms of their ability to deter cheating. We derive a set of possible "control regimes" which can be used by the MoF. Although we illustrate the use of the model using developing countries, it is also relevant to developed economies. ER -