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Current fiscal transparency and reporting practices in India place it behind most peer G20 economies, implying that policy makers are lacking critical data to ground their fiscal and other economic planning decisions. The increasing use of off-budget financing at the central government level in recent years represents one key example of reduced transparency—we provide estimates of the public sector borrowing requirement and an extended notion of the fiscal deficit, each of which shows a more expansionary stance in recent years than ‘headline’ deficit figures presented in budget documents. We then investigate the current state of fiscal reporting practices in India and suggest areas for reforms—these include enhanced IT systems, stronger central-local coordination, and a gradual transition to accrual accounting.

Business and Economics --- Accounting --- Budgeting --- Public Finance --- Structure and Scope of Government: General --- National Budget, Deficit, and Debt: General --- Public Administration --- Public Sector Accounting and Audits --- Debt --- Debt Management --- Sovereign Debt --- National Budget --- Budget Systems --- Public finance & taxation --- Financial reporting, financial statements --- Budgeting & financial management --- Government debt management --- Fiscal reporting --- Budget planning and preparation --- Fiscal transparency --- Fiscal risks --- Public financial management (PFM) --- Debts, Public --- Finance, Public --- Budget --- Fiscal policy --- India

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The COVID-19 lockdowns have brought about the need of large fiscal responses in all European countries. However, countries across Europe are differently equipped to respond to the shock due to differences in economic conditions and fiscal space. We build on the model by Berger et al. (2019) to compare gains from alternative mechanisms of EU fiscal integration in the presence of moral hazard. We show that any EU response strategy to the COVID-19 crisis excluding mutual financial support to member countries lacks credibility. Some form of fiscal risk sharing is indeed better than none, especially in presence of increasing sovereign default risk of some EU member countries. The moral hazard created by risk sharing can be hedged by introducing some form of fiscal delegation to Brussels. The desirable level of delegation, however, depends on its costs. When these are low, risk sharing and delegation are substitutes and it is optimal to opt for high delegation and low risk sharing. On the contrary, when delegation costs are high, centralization and risk sharing are complements and both are needed. Proposed arrangements at the EU level in response to the COVID-19 shock seem to reflect these basic insights by rotating around a combination of fiscal risk sharing and delegation in the form of fiscal spending conditionality.

Italy --- Finance: General --- Financial Risk Management --- Macroeconomics --- Public Finance --- Diseases: Contagious --- Structure and Scope of Government: General --- State and Local Government --- Intergovernmental Relations: General --- Governmental Loans, Loan Guarantees, Credits, and Grants --- Fiscal Policy --- Financial Crises --- Debt --- Debt Management --- Sovereign Debt --- General Financial Markets: Government Policy and Regulation --- Health Behavior --- Economic & financial crises & disasters --- Public finance & taxation --- Finance --- Infectious & contagious diseases --- Fiscal union --- Financial crises --- Public debt --- Moral hazard --- COVID-19 --- Fiscal policy --- Debts, Public --- Financial risk management --- Communicable diseases --- Covid-19