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When the Federal Reserve, European Central Bank and Bank of England purchased bank and state debt during the 2007-2008 crisis, it became apparent that, when technically divorced from fiscal policy, monetary policy cannot revive but only prevent economic activity deteriorating further. Pixley explains how conflicting social forces shape the diverse, complex relations of central banks to the money production of democracies and the immense money creation by capitalist banking. Central banks are never politically neutral and, despite unfair demands, are unable to prevent collapses to debt deflation or credit/asset inflation. They can produce debilitating depressions but not the recoveries desired in democracies and unwanted by capitalist banks or war finance logics. Drawing on economic sociology and economic histories, this book will appeal to informed readers interested in studying democracies, banks and central banking's ambivalent positions, via comparative and distributive perspectives.

Banks and banking, Central --- Banker's banks --- Banks, Central --- Central banking --- Central banks --- Banks and banking --- History.

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Bolder economic policy could have addressed the persistent bouts of deflation in post-bubble Japan, write Gene Park, Saori N. Katada, Giacomo Chiozza, and Yoshiko Kojo in Taming Japan's Deflation. Despite warnings from economists, intense political pressure, and well-articulated unconventional policy options to address this problem, Japan's central bank, the Bank of Japan (BOJ), resisted taking the bold actions that the authors believe would have significantly helped.With Prime Minister Abe Shinzo's return to power, Japan finally shifted course at the start of 2013 with the launch of Abenomics-an economic agenda to reflate the economy-and Abe's appointment of new leadership at the BOJ. As Taming Japan's Deflation shows, the BOJ's resistance to experimenting with bolder policy stemmed from entrenched policy ideas that were hostile to activist monetary policy. The authors explain how these policy ideas evolved over the course of the BOJ's long history and gained dominance because of the closed nature of the broader policy network.The explanatory power of policy ideas and networks suggests a basic inadequacy in the dominant framework for analysis ofthe politics of monetary policy derived from the literature on central bank independence. This approach privileges the interaction between political principals and their supposed agents, central bankers; but Taming Japan's Deflation shows clearly that central bankers' views, shaped by ideas and institutions, can be decisive in determining monetary policy. Through a combination of institutional analysis, quantitative empirical tests, in-depth case studies, and structured comparison of Japan with other countries, the authors show that, ultimately, the decision to adopt aggressive monetary policy depends largely on the bankers' established policy ideas and policy network.

Banks and banking, Central --- Deflation (Finance) --- Monetary policy --- Banker's banks --- Banks, Central --- Central banking --- Central banks --- Banks and banking --- Disinflation --- Finance --- Nihon Ginkō. --- Bank of Japan --- Japan. --- Nichigin --- Nippon Ginkō --- 日本銀行 --- Japan --- Economic policy --- E-books

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This paper takes a fresh look at the determinants of reserves holding with the aim of highlighting similarities and differences in the motives for holding reserves among emerging markets (EMs), advanced economies (AEs), and low-income countries (LICs). We apply two panel estimation techniques: fixed effects (FE) and common correlated effects pooled mean group (CCEPMG). FE regression results suggest that precautionary savings motives, both current account- and capital account-related, are generally the most important determinants of reserves holding across country groups and that their importance has increased for AEs and LICs since the global financial crisis while receding for EMs. Mercantilist motives matter mostly for EMs. Intertemporal motives have been gaining importance everywhere over time. The CCEPMG results confirm the importance of precautionary motives and suggest that current account motives matter only for EMs and LICs and capital account motives matter for all groups while being more important for EMs in both the shortand long runs. The CCEPMG results also point to the importance of taking into account unobserved common factors that affect coefficient estimates and the dynamic process through which reserves adjust to changes. At about 0.6, the speed of adjustment to the long-run equilibrium implies that more than half of the gap between actual and desired reserve holdings is closed within a year.

Exports and Imports --- Foreign Exchange --- Macroeconomics --- Banks and Banking --- 'Panel Data Models --- Spatio-temporal Models' --- Central Banks and Their Policies --- Financial Crises --- Current Account Adjustment --- Short-term Capital Movements --- International Investment --- Long-term Capital Movements --- Monetary Policy --- International economics --- Currency --- Foreign exchange --- Economic & financial crises & disasters --- Banking --- Capital account --- Capital inflows --- Current account --- Exchange rate arrangements --- Global financial crisis of 2008-2009 --- Balance of payments --- Reserves accumulation --- Central banks --- Capital movements --- Global Financial Crisis, 2008-2009 --- Foreign exchange reserves --- China, People's Republic of --- Panel Data Models --- Spatio-temporal Models

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This Technical Assistance Report discusses the findings and recommendations made by the IMF mission regarding monetary and foreign exchange operations in Uganda, Bank of Uganda (BOU) recapitalization, and Bank of Uganda Act revision. The presence of sizable precautionary and involuntary reserves and excessive short-end volatility has weakened the transmission mechanism in Uganda. The key challenge remains to enhance monetary and fiscal policy coordination and to ensure that institutional and operational arrangements are robust and conducive to efficient monetary operations framework. The BOU should raise the effectiveness of the monetary and foreign exchange operations framework. To foster further market development there is need to anchor short-term interest rates by using various fine-tuning instruments to ensure improved operational efficiency and strengthen transmission of policy signals across the curve.

Economic indicators. --- Economic indicators --- Business indicators --- Indicators, Business --- Indicators, Economic --- Leading indicators --- Economic history --- Quality of life --- Economic forecasting --- Index numbers (Economics) --- Social indicators --- Accounting --- Banks and Banking --- Finance: General --- Investments: General --- Banks --- Depository Institutions --- Micro Finance Institutions --- Mortgages --- Portfolio Choice --- Investment Decisions --- Central Banks and Their Policies --- Public Administration --- Public Sector Accounting and Audits --- General Financial Markets: General (includes Measurement and Data) --- Banking --- Finance --- Financial reporting, financial statements --- Investment & securities --- Liquidity --- Open market operations --- Financial statements --- Securities --- Asset and liability management --- Central banks --- Public financial management (PFM) --- Financial institutions --- Liquidity forecasting --- Banks and banking --- Economics --- Finance, Public --- Financial instruments --- Uganda

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This paper develops a new central bank transparency index for inflation-targeting central banks (CBT-IT index). It applies the CBT-IT index to the Czech National Bank (CNB), one of the most transparent inflation-targeting central banks. The CNB has invested heavily in developing a Forecasting and Policy Analysis System (FPAS) to implement a full-fledged inflation-forecast-targeting (IFT) regime. The components of CBT-IT index include measures of transparency about monetary policy objectives, the FPAS designed to support IFT, and the monetary policymaking process. For the CNB, all three components have shown substantial improvements over time but a few gaps remain. The CNB is currently working on eliminating some of these gaps.

Monetary policy. --- Monetary management --- Economic policy --- Currency boards --- Money supply --- Macroeconomics --- Economics: General --- International Economics --- Inflation --- Banks and Banking --- Money and Monetary Policy --- Finance: General --- Foreign Exchange --- Informal Economy --- Underground Econom --- Price Level --- Deflation --- Monetary Policy --- Central Banks and Their Policies --- Interest Rates: Determination, Term Structure, and Effects --- General Financial Markets: Government Policy and Regulation --- Economic & financial crises & disasters --- Economics of specific sectors --- Banking --- Monetary economics --- Finance --- Financial crises --- Economic sectors --- Prices --- Inflation targeting --- Monetary policy --- Central bank transparency --- Central banks --- Central bank policy rate --- Financial services --- Financial sector stability --- Financial sector policy and analysis --- Currency crises --- Informal sector --- Economics --- Interest rates --- Financial services industry --- Czech Republic