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This book develops in detail the simple idea that assertion is the expression of belief. In it the author puts forward a version of 'probabilistic semantics' which acknowledges that we are not perfectly rational, and which offers a significant advance in generality on theories of meaning couched in terms of truth conditions. It promises to challenge a number of entrenched and widespread views about the relations of language and mind. Part I presents a functionalist account of belief, worked through a modified form of decision theory. In Part II the author generates a theory of meaning in terms of 'assertibility conditions', whereby to know the meaning of an assertion is to know the belief it expresses.

Logic --- Lexicology. Semantics --- Conditionals (Logic) --- Truth --- Belief and doubt --- Psychology --- Conditionnels (Logique) --- Vérité --- Croyance et doute --- Psychologie --- 800.1 --- Conviction --- Philosophy --- Skepticism --- Certainty --- Necessity (Philosophy) --- Pragmatism --- Behavioral sciences --- Mental philosophy --- Mind --- Science, Mental --- Human biology --- Soul --- Mental health --- Conditional statements (Logic) --- Grammar, Comparative and general --- Doubt --- Consciousness --- Credulity --- Emotions --- Knowledge, Theory of --- Religion --- Will --- Agnosticism --- Rationalism --- Taalfilosofie --- Belief and doubt. --- Psychology. --- Truth. --- 800.1 Taalfilosofie --- Conditionals (Logic). --- Vérité --- Arts and Humanities