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Diwan and Galal looks at the structure and prospects of the Middle East economies after the 2011 Uprisings, focusing on issues of economic growth, inequality, the impact of oil, and the unfolding political transitions. On the growth question, the book looks into the extent of structural transformation of the economy, the political economy reasons for the lack of structural change, and the external conditions in the EU and in the GCC that underpin the lack of structural change. On inequality, the book offers new measures of equality of opportunity in human development and in the job market, and it also reviews the complex political economy of subsidy removal. Regarding natural resources, the volume provides three innovations: connecting the notion of 'oil curse' to the global phenomena of asset bubbles; evidence that resource curse effects do not rise monotonically with the size of the resource rent, but rather, according to an inverted U shape; and an extension of the concept of rent to the other non-oil rents that are also predominant in the region. Finally, the volume places the political transition in the region in a global perspective using various methods – theoretical, comparative, and empirical, and it explores the relationship between democracy in its variety of forms and economic development.
Economic History --- Business & Economics --- Middle East --- Economic conditions --- Economic policy. --- Regional economics. --- Macroeconomics. --- International economics. --- Development economics. --- Political economy. --- Regional/Spatial Science. --- Macroeconomics/Monetary Economics//Financial Economics. --- International Economics. --- Economic Policy. --- Development Economics. --- International Political Economy. --- Economic theory --- Political economy --- Social sciences --- Economic man --- Economics --- Economic development --- Economic nationalism --- Economic planning --- National planning --- State planning --- Planning --- National security --- Social policy --- Economic policy, Foreign --- Economic relations, Foreign --- Economics, International --- Foreign economic policy --- Foreign economic relations --- Interdependence of nations --- International economic policy --- International economics --- New international economic order --- Economic policy --- International relations --- Economic sanctions --- Regional planning --- Regionalism --- Space in economics --- Spatial economics. --- Spatial economics --- Regional economics
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This paper uses an original database of 469 politically connected firms under the Mubarak regime in Egypt to explore the economic effects of close state-business relations. Previous research has shown that political connections are lucrative. The paper addresses several questions raised by this research. Do connected firms receive favorable regulatory treatment? They do: connected firms are more likely to benefit from trade protection, energy subsidies, access to land, and regulatory enforcement. Does regulatory capture account for the high value of connected firms? In the sample, regulatory capture as revealed by energy subsidies and trade protection account for the higher profits of politically connected firms. Do politically connected firms hurt aggregate growth? The paper identifies the growth effects of the entry of politically connected firms by comparing detailed 4-digit sectors where they entered, between 1996 and 2006, and sectors that remained unconnected. The entry of connected firms into new, modern, and previously unconnected sectors slows aggregate employment growth and skews the distribution of employment toward less productive, smaller firms.
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