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Representative government and representation. --- Proportional representation. --- Elections. --- Politics, Practical. --- Gouvernement représentatif --- Représentation proportionnelle --- Elections --- Politique --- Representative government and representation --- Proportional representation --- Politics, Practical --- Gouvernement représentatif --- Représentation proportionnelle --- Élections --- Partis politiques

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Democracy --- Representative government and representation --- Elections --- Démocratie --- Gouvernement représentatif --- Canada --- Politics and government --- Politique et gouvernement

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Maurice Duverger is arguably the most distinguished French political scientist of the last century, but his major impact has been largely in the English-speaking world. His book, Political Parties, first translated into English in 1954, has influenced both the party politics literature (which continues to make use of his typology of party organization) and the electoral systems literature. His chief contributions there deal with what have come to be called in his honor Duverger's Law and Duverger's Hypothesis. The first argues that countries with the plurality rule will tend to become two-party systems; the second argues that countries using proportional representation (PR) will tend to become multi-party systems. Duverger also identifies specific mechanisms that will produce these effects, conventionally referred to as "mechanical effects" and "psychological effects." However, while Duverger's Hypothesis concerning the link between PR and multipartism is now widely accepted, the empirical evidence that plurality voting results in two-party systems is remarkably weak—with the U.S. the most notable exception. The chapters in this volume consider national-level evidence about Duverger's law in the world’s largest, longest-lived and most successful democracies of Britain, Canada, India and the United States. One set of chapters involves looking at the overall evidence for and against Duverger's Law in these countries; the other set deals with evidence about the mechanical and psychological effects predicted by Duverger. The result is an incisive analysis of electoral and party dynamics that will appeal to researchers, academics, students, policymakers, and policy watchers around the world. Sponsored by the Center for the Study of Democracy, University of California, Irvine.

Comparative government. --- Election law --- Political parties --- Voting --- Duverger, Maurice, --- Canada --- Great Britain --- India --- United States --- England --- Politics and government. --- Government --- History, Political --- Politics and government --- Polls --- Elections --- Politics, Practical --- Social choice --- Suffrage --- Parties, Political --- Party systems, Political --- Political party systems --- Political science --- Divided government --- Intra-party disagreements (Political parties) --- Political conventions --- Law, Election --- Constitutional law --- Comparative political systems --- Comparative politics --- Government, Comparative --- Political systems, Comparative --- Law and legislation --- Representations of groups. --- Topological transformation groups. --- Electoral law --- Balloting

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"Strategic voting is classically defined as "voting for one's second preferred option to prevent one's least preferred option from winning when one's first preference has no chance." Voters want their votes to be effective, and casting a ballot that will have no influence on an election is undesirable--therefore, some voters cast a strategic ballot when they decide it is useful. This edited volume includes case studies of strategic voting behavior in Israel, Germany, Japan, Belgium, Spain, Switzerland, Canada, and the UK, and provides a conceptual framework for understanding strategic voting behavior in all types of electoral systems. The classic definition explicitly considers strategic voting in a single race with a single winner, which has at least three candidates. This situation is more common in electoral systems that have single member districts that employ plurality or majoritarian electoral rules and have multiparty systems. Indeed, much of the literature on strategic voting to date has considered systems like those in Canada and the United Kingdom. This book contributes to a more general understanding of strategic voting behavior by taking into account a wide variety of institutional contexts, such as single transferable vote rules, proportional representation, two round and mixed electoral systems"--

Elections --- Voting --- Representative government and representation --- Political parties --- Parliamentary government --- Political representation --- Representation --- Self-government --- Constitutional history --- Constitutional law --- Political science --- Democracy --- Republics --- Suffrage --- Electoral politics --- Franchise --- Polls --- Politics, Practical --- Plebiscite --- Political campaigns --- Social choice --- Voting research. --- Voting behavior research --- Research --- Parties, Political --- Party systems, Political --- Political party systems --- Divided government --- Intra-party disagreements (Political parties) --- Political conventions --- Balloting --- Political Science --- Political Process --- Campaigns & Elections