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It is well known that children's activities are full of pretending and imagination, but it is less appreciated that animals can also show similar activities. Originally published in 2002, this book focuses on comparing and contrasting children's and animals' pretenses and imaginative activities. In the text, overviews of research present conflicting interpretations of children's understanding of the psychology of pretense, and describe sociocultural factors which influence children's pretenses. Studies of nonhuman primates provide examples of their pretenses and other simulative activities, explore their representational and imaginative capacities and compare their skills with children. Although the psychological requirements for pretending are controversial, evidence presented in this volume suggests that great apes and even monkeys may share capacities for imagination with children, and that children's early pretenses may be less psychological than they appear.

Imagination in children. --- Psychology, Comparative. --- Behavior, Comparative --- Comparative behavior --- Comparative psychology --- Ethology, Comparative --- Intelligence of animals --- Zoology --- Animal behavior --- Animal intelligence --- Animal psychology --- Human behavior --- Instinct --- Child psychology

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Animals fall in love, establish rules for fair play, exchange valued goods and services, hold "funerals" for fallen comrades, deploy sex as a weapon, and communicate with one another using rich vocabularies. Animals also get jealous and violent or greedy and callous and develop irrational phobias, just like us. Monkeys address inequality, wolves miss each other, elephants grieve for their dead, and prairie dogs name the humans they encounter. Human and animal behavior is not as different as once believed.In Not So Different, the biologist Nathan H. Lents argues that the same evolutionary forces of cooperation and competition have shaped both humans and animals. Identical emotional and instinctual drives govern our actions. By acknowledging this shared programming, the human experience no longer seems unique, but in that loss we gain a fuller appreciation of such phenomena as sibling rivalry and the biological basis of grief, helping us lead more grounded, moral lives among animals, our closest kin. Through a mix of colorful reporting and rigorous scientific research, Lents describes the exciting strides scientists have made in decoding animal behavior and bringing the evolutionary paths of humans and animals closer together. He marshals evidence from psychology, evolutionary biology, cognitive science, anthropology, and ethology to further advance this work and to drive home the truth that we are distinguished from animals only in degree, not in kind.

Animal behavior. --- Psychology, Comparative. --- Behavior, Comparative --- Comparative behavior --- Comparative psychology --- Ethology, Comparative --- Intelligence of animals --- Zoology --- Animal behavior --- Animal intelligence --- Animal psychology --- Human behavior --- Instinct --- Animals --- Animals, Habits and behavior of --- Behavior, Animal --- Ethology --- Ethologists --- Psychology, Comparative --- Behavior

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Tool-making or culture, language or religious belief: ever since Darwin, thinkers have struggled to identify what fundamentally differentiates human beings from other animals. Michael Tomasello weaves his twenty years of comparative studies of humans and great apes into a compelling argument that cooperative social interaction is the key to our cognitive uniqueness. Tomasello maintains that our prehuman ancestors, like today's great apes, were social beings who could solve problems by thinking. But they were almost entirely competitive, aiming only at their individual goals. As ecological changes forced them into more cooperative living arrangements, early humans had to coordinate their actions and communicate their thoughts with collaborative partners. Tomasello's "shared intentionality hypothesis" captures how these more socially complex forms of life led to more conceptually complex forms of thinking. In order to survive, humans had to learn to see the world from multiple social perspectives, to draw socially recursive inferences, and to monitor their own thinking via the normative standards of the group. Even language and culture arose from the preexisting need to work together and coordinate thoughts. A Natural History of Human Thinking is the most detailed scientific analysis to date of the connection between human sociality and cognition.

Cognitive psychology --- Developmental psychology --- Cognition --- Evolutionary psychology. --- Psychology, Comparative. --- Social aspects. --- Behavior, Comparative --- Comparative behavior --- Comparative psychology --- Ethology, Comparative --- Intelligence of animals --- Zoology --- Animal behavior --- Animal intelligence --- Animal psychology --- Human behavior --- Instinct --- Psychology --- Human evolution --- Evolutionary psychology --- Psychology, Comparative --- Social aspects --- Ontwikkelingspsychologie --- Cognitieve psychologie --- Cognition-Social aspects.

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We are social animals, with evolved mechanisms to discern the beliefs and desires of others. This social reason is linked to the concept of intentionality, the ability to attribute beliefs and desires to others. In this book Jay Schulkin explores social reason from philosophical, psychological, and cognitive neuroscientific perspectives. He argues for a pragmatist approach, in which the role of experience--that is, interaction with others--is central to any consideration of action in the social world. Unlike some philosophers of mind, Jay Schulkin considers social reason to be a real feature of the information processing system in the brain, in addition to a useful cognitive tool in predicting behavior. Throughout the book, he incorporates neurobiological evidence for a domain-specific system for social cognition.Topics covered include the centrality of intentional attribution to social cognition, the rise of cognitive science in the twentieth century, the functional argument for the role of experience, intentional understanding in nonhuman primates, theory of mind and natural kinds in children, autism as a disorder of theory of mind, and the integration of emotions into theory of mind.

Cognition --- Cognition and culture --- Human information processing --- Psychology, Comparative --- Psychology --- Social Sciences --- Social aspects --- Cognition and culture. --- Psychology, Comparative. --- Social aspects. --- Behavior, Comparative --- Comparative behavior --- Comparative psychology --- Ethology, Comparative --- Intelligence of animals --- Information processing, Human --- Culture and cognition --- Zoology --- Animal behavior --- Animal intelligence --- Animal psychology --- Human behavior --- Instinct --- Bionics --- Information theory in psychology --- Perception --- Culture --- Ethnophilosophy --- Ethnopsychology --- Socialization --- COGNITIVE SCIENCES/General --- NEUROSCIENCE/General

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The aim of Advances in the Study of Behavior is to serve scientists engaged in the study of animal behavior, including psychologists, neuroscientists, biologists, ethologists, pharmacologists, endocrinologists, ecologists, and geneticists. Articles in the series present critical reviews of significant research programs with theoretical syntheses, reformulation of persistent problems, and/or highlighting new and exciting research concepts. Advances in the Study of Behavior is now available online at