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What makes people decide to vote? In addressing this simple question, André Blais examines the factors that increase or decrease turnout at the aggregate, cross-national level and considers what affects people's decision to vote or to abstain. In doing so, Blais assesses the merits and limitations of the rational choice model in explaining voter behavior. The past few decades have witnessed a rise in the popularity of the rational choice model in accounting for voter turnout, and more recently a groundswell of outspoken opposition to rational choice theory. Blais tackles this controversial s

Rational choice theory --- Voting --- #SBIB:011.AANKOOP --- #SBIB:324H42 --- #SBIB:32H3 --- Balloting --- Polls --- Elections --- Politics, Practical --- Social choice --- Suffrage --- Politieke structuren: verkiezingen --- Politieke wetenschappen: inleidende werken, handboeken, methoden --- Rational choice theory. --- Voting. --- Vote --- Choix rationnels, Théorie des --- Government - General --- Law, Politics & Government --- Political Institutions & Public Administration - General --- Théorie du choix rationnel --- Sciences politiques --- Elections et referendum

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There are an astonishing variety of election laws across contemporary democratic societies. In Establishing the Rules of the Game, Louis Massicotte, André Blais, and Antoine Yoshinaka provide the first thorough examination of these laws. The study incorporates original data collected from more than sixty democracies around the world, and touches on oft-ignored, yet extremely important, aspects of election laws. The countries covered by the study include Argentina, Brazil, Canada, France, Japan, the Netherlands, the Philippines, Romania, and the United Kingdom. The authors focus on six dimensions of election laws: the right to vote, the right to be a candidate, the electoral register, the agency in charge of the election, the procedure for casting votes, and the procedure to sort out the winners and losers.Massicotte, Blais, and Yoshinaka uncover underlying patterns, explaining why certain types of country tend to adopt a given sets of rules. In general, former colonies adopt the same laws as their former mother country. There is also a tendency for established democracies to be more inclusive than non-established ones. The authors point out sociological patterns and review normative and practical arguments for and against each set of rules, providing invaluable information for students of elections and democratic theory as well as election practicioners.

Social case work. --- Social case work with children. --- Social workers. --- Case work, Social --- Casework, Social --- Social casework --- Human services personnel --- Children --- Social service --- Counseling --- Friendly visiting --- Interviewing --- Election law. --- Elections --- Law, Election --- Constitutional law --- Law and legislation --- Election law --- #SBIB:044.AANKOOP --- #SBIB:324H42 --- Politieke structuren: verkiezingen --- Electoral law --- POLITICAL SCIENCE / Political Process / Campaigns & Elections. --- Droit électoral --- Etudes comparatives

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"Strategic voting is classically defined as "voting for one's second preferred option to prevent one's least preferred option from winning when one's first preference has no chance." Voters want their votes to be effective, and casting a ballot that will have no influence on an election is undesirable--therefore, some voters cast a strategic ballot when they decide it is useful. This edited volume includes case studies of strategic voting behavior in Israel, Germany, Japan, Belgium, Spain, Switzerland, Canada, and the UK, and provides a conceptual framework for understanding strategic voting behavior in all types of electoral systems. The classic definition explicitly considers strategic voting in a single race with a single winner, which has at least three candidates. This situation is more common in electoral systems that have single member districts that employ plurality or majoritarian electoral rules and have multiparty systems. Indeed, much of the literature on strategic voting to date has considered systems like those in Canada and the United Kingdom. This book contributes to a more general understanding of strategic voting behavior by taking into account a wide variety of institutional contexts, such as single transferable vote rules, proportional representation, two round and mixed electoral systems"--

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Robert (Bob) Andrew Young (1950-2017) was Canada Research Chair in Multilevel Governance at the University of Western Ontario and one of Canada's most distinguished political scientists. In Across Boundaries Young's former colleagues and students bring together contributions from his extensive network. These essays speak to Young's legacy while providing new insight into research in multilevel governance, secession, and political economy.

Central-local government relations. --- Federal government. --- Political science.